Ext 6116/46(S) 'Secret Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, nos 356-416, August 1946-November 1947' [‎201r] (409/978)

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Colombia suggested four non-permanent
members plus U.S., U.S.S.R. and one other
permanent member. The U.S. proposal
that all eleven of the Council should be
represented found small favour. The
r^jority held that a single Commissioner
would have been the ideal solution, had it
been practical politics. In H.M. Govern
ment’s view, the French proposal was far
better than the American, but that a small
committee of disinterested States, chosen
by the Security Council, was better still.
On the 24th and the 25th July the
Soviet, Bulgarian and Yugoslav delegates
put up two arguments, ( 1 ) that recom
mendations under Chapter vi required the
consent of the parties concerned : ( 2 ) that
a decision under article 34 to conduct an
investigation would not be binding if it
infringed article 2 , paragraph 7 (domestic
jurisdiction). The first argument is
devised by wilfully isolating article 37 ( 2 )
and is flatly contradicted by article 38.
The second, if admitted, will make non
sense of the whole security system of the
United Nations, and comes with ill-grace
from a country which took the line that
Russia did over the question of the Indians
in S. Africa.
Such was the state of affairs on the 29th
July when the Security Council voted on
the U.S. resolution, thus laboriously built
up by long debate in the Council, from the
recommendations of the Commission which
the Council itself had set up. The reso
lution was voted clause by clause, and each
clause was adopted, Russia abstaining the
while. Then, when the resolution was
taken as a whole, M. Gromyko imposed his
country’s veto. Poland voted with Russia,
the remaining nine members of the Council
voted for the resolution. Russia’s own
resolution, based on no facts that the
Investigation Commission discovered, has
still to come before the Security Council.
This is Russia’s tenth imposition of the
veto. It was no surprise. It was but a
continuation of her conduct and that of
her clients during the whole investigation.
Its seriousness for the future United
Nations lies in this. As in the Corfu
debate, it is a veto used in face not only of
an overwhelming majority of members, but
in contradiction of the plain facts as estab
lished by investigation. It means that,
according to the existing rules, the Security
Council cannot work for peace if one
permanent member, in this case Russia,
determines to oppose. It is an obvious
deduction that, peace being the object of
the majority of the members of the Security
Council, some other way will have to be
found, and the world comes gradually to
realise, in politics as it has done in
economics, that the unwilling must not be
allowed to forbid the co-operation of the
willing.
Mr. Herschel Johnson described the
Soviet action as a flagrant abuse of the
veto and said that the U.S. had
not said their last word; and the British
Government are equally determined that
no veto shall hinder the attainment of
peace.
Membership
According to the Charter ‘ ‘ Membership
in the United Nations is open to all other
peace-loving states which accept the obliga
tions contained in the present Charter and,
in the judgment of the Organisation, are
able and willing to carry out these obliga
tions. The admission of any sugh state
to membership in the United Nations will
be effected by a decision of the General
Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council ” (Article 4, paragraphs 1
and 2 ); and “the Organisation is based
on the sovereign equality of all its mem
bers ’’ (Article 2, paragraph 1 ). Last year,
however, of the 8 applicants 5 were not
recommended by the Security Council.
Albania and Outer Mongolia failed to
secure the requisite number of votes, and
Eire, Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and Portugal were
vetoed by the U.S.S.R. on the ground that
they had no diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union. The use of the veto for
reasons quite unconnected with the relevant
articles of the Charter led to a demand in
the General Assembly for an enquiry into
the procedure governing the admission of
new members. In accordance with a
resolution passed by the Assembly con
ferences took place in June and July
between Committees of the Assembly and
of the Security Council. The Australian
delegation submitted the comprehensive
draft as a working paper. As a result of
the conferences the Assembly Committee
drafted proposals, which the Committee of
Experts of the Security Council are now
examining. The Assembly Committee
agreed unanimously that the Assembly was
not entitled, under Article 4 (2), to decide
to admit a new member except upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.
A bare majority of the Committee, viz.,
India, Norway and the Soviet Union, with
Australia and Cuba opposing, maintained
that the Committee itself could not suggest
rules which would in any way diminish the
powers of the Security Council over the
admission of new members. Australia had
contended in the November proceedings
that initial and final responsibility for the