Ext 6116/46(S) 'Secret Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, nos 356-416, August 1946-November 1947' [‎193r] (393/978)

13
“ it would be in the best interests of Italy
if she were to ratify the Treaty and clear
up the technical state of war and allow
normal relations to be resumed . . . The
Italian Government ought not to allow
thgpiselves to be dissuaded from immediate
r"fication by the argument that Italy
should wait on action by the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile Signor De Gasperi had
apparently become somewhat alarmed by
the trend of discussions among the party
leaders who were now proposing to defer
the whole question until after the summer
recess. He decided that it was a question
of taking the bull by the horns and pre
senting the question as a whole in the
Assembly on the basis of a Government
motion to the effect that the Italian Govern
ment should be authorized to ratify at the
moment the Treaty was brought into force
by the Four Powers under Article 10 .
On the same night, the Constituent Assem
bly proceeded to reject by a narrow margin
of votes (232-204) a motion to postpone
consideration of the question. The veteran
Signor Orlando, who sponsored the motion,
complained rather pathetically that the
Assembly was very weary after eleven
months of unceasing labour and needed
more time for the consideration of such
an important matter. He was supported,
as was expected, by Togliatti and his Com
munists, the Nenni Socialists, the Qualun-
quists, Labour Democrats and a few others,
while the Government had the backing of
all the Christian Democrats, the Saragat
Socialists, the Liberals and some
Republicans.
The big debate began the following day
and has continued in desultory fashion for
the best part of a week. Count Sforza in
his opening speech described the advan
tages of ratifying the Treaty. Italy would
have a chance of admission to the United
Nations at the General Assembly this year,
she would be in a better position to take a
full part in, and obtain full benefit of, the
scheme being worked out in Paris on the
basis of the Marshall proposals; and she
would be on sounder ground for working
for a revision of the Treaty where it
appeared palpably unjust. In a lengthy
speech Signor Nitti took the opposite
standpoint, adverting to the argument that
the right time to ratify was after deposit
of the signatures of the four Great Powers.
His speech, after some tart personal criti
cism of Count Sforza, contained the sug
gestion that the Western Powers had a
considerable share of responsibility for the
rise of Fascism in Italy. A vote on the
Government’s motion was not expected
before Wednesday, the 30th July.
Trade A greements
With the end of U.N.R.R.A. help in
sight, and with the prospect of a poor
wheat crop, which seems likely to fall far
short of Italy’s minimum requirements, the
De Gasperi Government were already pur
suing the efforts of previous Governments
to re-establish trade relations with various
European countries before the Conference
for European Economic Co-operation
began.
On the 5th of June a protocol to the
Italo-Belgian Agreement was signed. This
arranges for an exchange of goods up to
the 30th April, 1948, to a value of 40
milliard lire, a sum which is three times
as great as the figure reached in exchange
between the two countries during the past
year. The agreement also provides for
payment to be effected through the Italo-
Belgian “clearing” at a rate repre
senting the medium of the official and
‘ ‘ export ’ ’ dollar rates, instead of as
hitherto at the official rate. It is thought
that this may become a precedent for future
commercial agreements with other coun
tries. Trade with Belgium is of some im
portance to Italy. Her exports to Belgium
amounted to over 1,400 million lire in
1946 and her imports to 323 million only,
leaving her with a favourable trade balance
of 1,077 million lire.
In spite of political difficulties Italy and
Yugoslavia appear to have concluded a
trade agreement. The Yugoslavs will
supply Italy with chrome, iron ore, copper,
timber and coal, for which Italy will pay
in Italian lire deposited in Italy in the
name of the Yugoslav Government. The
Italians will export to Yugoslavia rayon,
Olivetti typewriters, buses and agricultural
machinery, and the value of these goods
will be subtracted from the Yugoslav
account held in Italy. This somewhat
unusual method of settling accounts has
been adopted because difficulties arose over
exchange values. The Yugoslavs demanded
a rate of 6-5 lire to the dinar, the Italians
insisted on only 4.
On the 2nd July Italy signed an
agreement with Czechoslovakia, which
covered not only exchange of goods, but
settled the question of Italian property
confiscated under the Czechoslovak
industrial nationalisation scheme. No
details are yet available.
As far back as last February the Italian
Government showed a desire to reopen
trade relations with Germany through the
occupying authorities. Under the Nazi
and Fascist regimes trade between the two
countries was artificially stimulated, until
by 1939 29-4 per cent, of Italy’s imports