Coll 28/111 ‘Persia. Kermanshah – Political diaries.’ [‎16v] (33/751)

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Colonel Jehangiri, who was removed from Kermanshah largely as a result of his
insufficiently helpful attitude to the British authorities.
8. The Farmandar of Hamadan has also been changed recently, and the
incumbent of that post is an official named Sayyid Majidi, regarding whom little
is known at present.
A
(c) Situation in Kurdistan.
9. Both the Kurdish rebels and the Persian military authorities have found
it impossible to be very active during January owing to heavy falls of snow and
to the bitterly cold weather which prevailed here for several weeks, until the
25th January. The Persian military authorities, probably because they suspected
or sensed an easing-off in the Kurdish rebels’ liking for the struggle, decided to
advance upon Diwanderre (40 miles north of Senna)—where the garrison was
beleaguered—and, after a skirmish with the Kurds at Zagheh, near Diwanderre,
about the 12th January, relieved their garrison. About thirty-four tribesmen
were killed and 150 prisoners were taken; the Persian military authorities
expressed the intention of shooting the prisoners as a warning to other Kurds.
Lest there should be a wholesale massacre of the latter, this threat was reported
to His Majesty’s Minister at Tehran, who took steps through the Persian
Minister of War to prevent it.
10. It can hardly be doubted that, if large numbers of Kurds had been shot
or hanged in cold blood as was originally suggested, the Kurdish rebels’ hatred
for the Persian administration would have been intensified and their determina
tion to resist would have been strengthened. If the Persian military authorities
cherished hopes of crushing Kurdish resistance by intimidating the Kurds as a
result of wholesale shootings and hangings, it is almost certain hhat these hopes
would have been doomed to disappointment. As the Persian authorities must
surely realise the unlikelihood of breaking Kurdish resistance by resorting to
“ frightfulness,” one is forced to the conclusion that either the threat to shoot
the 150 Kurds was an idle one which it was not seriously intended to carry out,
or that irresponsible Persian officers were contemplating action which might
have produced serious consequences.
11. At a moment when the Russians are reliably reported to be encouraging
the Kurds to hope that, with Soviet support, they will be able to secure redress
from the Persian authorities or even some measure of autonomy, it would seem
high time that the Persian authorities—in their own interests—made a serious
attempt to seek a friendly settlement with the Kurds. To alienate Kurdish
sympathies still further is the surest way of driving the Kurds into the arms of
the Russians and to encourage the Kurds to turn to the latter for help which
has been denied to them by the British military authorities.
12. A hint in the above sense was conveyed to the newly-arrived Ustandar
(Governor-General), Amir-i-Kull, to-day, and he appeared much impressed with
the soundness of the advice. It was emphasised that the opinion expressed by
His Majesty’s Consul was a purely personal one, and did not necessarily
represent the views of His Majesty’s "Government. The Ustandar admitted that
the Kurds had some cause for complaint, and that there was good reason to
attempt a new approach to the Kurdish problem. As a sure means of placating
the Kurds the suggestion was put forward by His Majesty’s Consul that
conscription (of which the Kurds strongly disapprove) might be suspended—at
least temporarily—in Kurdistan. This suggestion aroused no unfavourable
comment, and it is not unlikely that the new Ustandar, who is making a series
of tours in his LTstan on assuming office and expects to visit Kurdistan shortly,
will make some efforts to act upon the advice given to him. Indeed, he expressed
the desire to discuss with His Majesty’s Consul the Kurdish problem and to
obtain his views thereon and suggestions for solving it.
13. At the moment the roads in Central Kurdistan are blocked with
4 to 10 feet of snow, and no military or guerrilla operations on a large scale can
be attempted with any certainty of success. Sakkiz (75 miles north-west of
Senna) is still occupied by rebel Kurds, and rumours from Kurdish or alarmist
Persian sources that the Russians have moved so far south as that town are
regarded as untrue by competent judges of the situation. It is practically
certain, however, that a Soviet detachment has for some time past been stationed
in Sauj Bulagh, 120 miles north-west of Senna. The Persian military authorities