Coll 28/120 ‘Persia. Ahwaz – Consular diaries.’ [‎271r] (542/669)

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With Comolur:--
of the
y^^er^eopetary o? State x ^\ t
f/s* -orei^ Affaire Tiie period under review jias
conditions
i&X
vJ^Of
Prf Gt'
'DOC An P CIO IT I OKS
t 1944
TO KAKCH? 1945
1 O I?
" * t }
fin* 8
i J
T- o.^V.
VjiSS. O
5 -M"
...
of co.nple iijinc,trvity on al
enuen in
11 fronts. This
is doubtless due inVpa-rf ftfe * 1 ing tnat trie end of
tne war is in sight, and that it win bring for Persia
new economic and political conditions? her "independence",
and new problems. Until that day nobody win do
anything*
in
.In ^
orated
2. Tne tnoai situation nas nownere net
and has in one notable respect improved. At
beginning of Jfarch Abdullah Knan Zarghampur, of '.he
3oir Anmed 3ardsiri (lowerJ, came in to Behbehan and
submitted to Persian Government authority. Me has
now been recogni.sed as responsible for the security of
nis own section of the Kun Ga?u, though not of the Kuh
Galu as a whole; and he has been assured that provided
ne carries out tnis satisfactorily, his previous sins
yV) be forgotten. He has also, it is betievec,
come to terms with his half brother Khosrow; but it is
impossible to say ho / long it will be before that
extremely unreliable young man again makes trouble.
During the last month of 1944 Brigadier Humayan: had
been following the policy of frightening Abdulina Khan
to terms by givin^ open support to his enemies anong
tne other Kuh Galu Khans (including Knosrow;. This
may have had some effect on Abdul * 1 ah, in addition to
the more conciliatory policy of General Piruz from
Shiraz, whxch was r* o later followed by Humayuai.
But its weakness were iaosn apparent, botxi in ths
grounds which it ^a* r e no tribemen generally to sispect
the Government netnods ("divide et impera" has nsver
been a policy designed to inspire confidence? which is
what is needed in Persia), and in the unreliability
of the Khans which -ne Government were supporting.
Moreover, these latter were liable to consider tne
Government under an obi igation to then to a degree
where tney were bcvir. < -o be disappointed, (tney now
resent the imx^roved relationship between the Government
and Abdullah Knan). This policy is reflected m the
assurance that has now been given to these khans of
Government support xu case of encroachment on “lieir
independence by Abdullah Khan - an assurance which may
well encourage the more irresponsible among then, such
as Khosrow and Kalek Mansur Basht 3avi,to stir up
agitation in opposition to Abdullah Khan when i" suits
their booK. It may be assuined tnat with tnis year’s
good harvest, tne economic condition of the tribes, and
tuerefore tne security cf tne area, wiV 1 be satisfactory;
but if or when tne economic condition deteriorate, and
particularly if tne rationed goods, tea, sugar and cloth,
cease to be available to the
lawless Kuh Ga!u wilT return
tribes, the problem of the
to its former proportions.
5 * 0 !’’owing on the Hiauab operations cf last
June/
3