Coll 28/103 ‘Persia. Perso Russian Relations’ [‎18v] (36/190)

had withheld, of going to call on him. In the course of the visit he captivated
the young Shah and induced him to accept a gift of Soviet tanks and aeroplanes.
The" aircraft—'bombers and fast fighters—were not such as Persia needed, and
the tanks would have been too heavy for any of the bridges in Persia, but the
giftiorse was not examined with indecent curiosity. When, however, the
material was ready to be handed over, the Soviet Ambassador produced a list of
stringent conditions which gave the Persian Government and the Shah good
reason to think that the main object was to secure influence in the Persian army!
and caused them to decline the gift by asking to be allowed to accept it without
conditions. The displeasure of the Soviet Government was shown by the
immediate removal of the ambassador and by the omission of Kalinin to send
the customary telegram to the Shah at the Persian New Year, and comments by
members of the Soviet Embassy show that they considered the refusal of a present
offered by Stalin in person as impiety, not merely ingratitude.
3. The refusal of the war material, however, was a slight set-back to
Russian aims, compared with the rejection in October 1944 of the Soviet demand
for an oil concession. The word “ demand ” is used correctly, for the Soviet
negotiator, M. Kavtoradze, did not submit terms for examination, but demanded
the grant of a concession over a huge area in principle, the minor details such
as payments to be worked out afterwards. The arrogance of this request was
the more striking, in that the British and American companies which were
bidding for a concession in the south at that moment were offering keenly
competitive terms which were being checked for the Persian Government by one
of the best firms of consultants (American) in the world. The area envisaged
in the Soviet demand was large: for prospecting purposes the Soviet Govern
ment wanted rights over 216,000 square kilom. in Northern Azerbaijan, Gilan,
Mazanderan, Semnan and Northern Khorassan; after five years 150,000 square
kilom. would be selected for exploitation; and, of course, the exploiters would be,
not a company, but the Soviet Government—a circumstance which M. Kavtoradze
seemed to think should make a special appeal to the Persian Government. There
is reason to believe that the Soviet Government had in mind something more than
an oil concession—perhaps something which in practice would have resembled
the old chartered companies. To arouse hostility against the Persian Govern
ment, Soviet spokesmen talked of the roads which would have been built and
the agricultural and irrigation projects which would have been undertaken if
the concession had been granted; and one of the Persian delegates at the San
Francisco Conference had to listen to a long harangue by a man attached to the
Soviet delegation, who assured him that, unlike the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
who did nothing to improve the area where they worked but merely exploited it,
the Soviet oil concern would turn the concession area into a smiling tree-covered
landscape. This could, in fact, be easily done without net loss to the Soviet
Government if the Persian Government had to grant, as it was evidently expected
to do, the blank concession dictated by M. Kavtoradze. On all financial and
economic transactions between Russia and Persia, such as the munitions agree
ment and various barter agreements, Persia is always a heavy loser, and it can
be certain that in concluding an oil concession the Russians would have left
themselves such a margin that they could carry out specious public works and
give their Persian employees conditions better than elsewhere (except perhaps
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) in Persia and so set up a strain which
would serve Russia’s political ends. Besides, with a huge economic concern spread
over 150,000 square kilom. of territory, the Russians could influence the
administration, the courts, and the elections in and near that area, and make
themselves not only all-powerful there, but indirectly a power in the rest of the
country too. But the Soviet proposals were rejected early in October 1944, and,
moreover, the Majlis, in a mood of patriotic excitement, accepted a Bill tabled
by the demagogue, Dr. Musaddiq, on the 2nd December, 1944, prohibiting the
grant of any oil concession and passed it into law forthwith.
4. There still remained one means by which Russia could expect to gain
influence more or less unobtrusively: the elections to the XV Majlis. The law
on the subject is rigid : the elections should have been announced on the
12th September, 1945, and been begun about the 12th December, and even if,
as is permissible and customary, they had run on for three months, they would
have taken place almost entirely before the 2nd March—the last date, under
the tripartite treaty of January 1942, for the evacuation of the Allied troops
from Persia, The Persian Government, however, had had experience enough
with the small band of Tudeh Deputies which Soviet influence had placed m
the Majlis, although only seven in number, with their discipline and the support