Coll 28/103 ‘Persia. Perso Russian Relations’ [‎3r] (5/190)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Bevin.—{Received k 2§th March.)
(No. 76. Secret.)
Sir, V-X Tehran, loth March, 1946.
y IN my despatch No. 65, dated the 3rd March, I transmitted a note on the
question of North Persia. The note stopped at the point where it had become
clear that the Russians did not intend to withdraw their troops from Persia
by the date fixed by the tripartite treaty. I now have the honour to submit
some speculations as to the effect that Soviet policy is likely to have in this part
of the world. It is an easier task than it used to be, as the Russians have begun
to show their hand almost as openly as Hitler used to do, though they have never
provided us with a succinct “ Mein Kampf ” so that we might study the action
in comparison with the programme. Eight years in close contact with Soviet
Russia—nearly half from inside Russia, the rest at a sensitive spot in the Soviet
“ security belt ”—have convinced me that the attitude of the rulers of Russia,
whoever they may be, towards the rest of the world resembles that of the early
Moslem lawyers, who named it the Dar al Harb, or Region of War, as opposed
to their own Region of Islam. The Region of War comprised all lands where
Islam was not dominant, and it was legitimate to make war on any of them, the
only criterion being the prospects of success. The Soviet Government seem to
have decided that this is a favourable moment to effect the virtual inclusion of"
part of Persia in the Dar al Soviet and to establish indirect control oyer the rest
of the country. -v^
2. It would seem to be a simple and straightforward matter to convict
Russia of aggression for her behaviour in provoking the Azerbaijan movement
and in retaining troops in Persia after the treaty date, but behind the defence
that the troops have a right to be in Persia under the 1921 treaty there is the
moral claim of the Soviet Government to represent the policy which used to be
called Liberal. This policy is well set forth by E. G. Browne in his book “ The
Persian Revolution of 1905-09.” In his introduction he states that his book is
based on the following assumptions :—
“ (1) That in this world diversity, not uniformity, is the higher law and
the more desirable state.
“ (2) That everything in this world has its own generic perfection, or as
the Babis quaintly phrase it, its own Paradise, which is only
attainable by the realisation of its own highest potentialities, not
by the adoption of the attributes of something else.
“ (3) That, whether it be a question of individuals or nations, the destruc
tion of a distinctive type is a loss to the universe and therefore an
evil.”
If any of those ministers of the Czar who were responsible for Russian policy
from 1905-17 ever read Professor Browne’s principles, they probably thought
him at best an impracticable idealist, and they would have considered any British
statesman who professed to believe in them as a humbug concealing behind a
sanctimonious facade the cynical imperialism of the British Government. The
Soviet Government, however, would probably claim the principles as their own.
It is reactionary Persian Governments, they would say, that have tried to iron
out the diversity which should be the spice of life, making no allowance for
differences of race and language; and that by neglecting education and failing
to control the power of wealth and landownership, have prevented the Persians
from even beginning to attain the realisation of their own potentialities. How
different, the Soviet Government would say, is the situation in Russia, where
every minority is encouraged to use its own language and to develop its own
culture, and opportunities for education and self-development are open to all
individuals without discrimination.
[77—1]