Coll 28/97(1) ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries.’ [‎208r] (415/807)

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7. Broadcasting.
(i) Reference Intelligence Summary No. 24 (current), paragraph 12. The
Germans’ broadcasts continue daily, and are composed of the usual propaganda
and news. The reception was at first weak, but has improved recently. The name
f Mohsin Jamarani of Tehran is quoted as joint announcer at Berlin. This
individual is a student who refused to return to Iran at the outbreak of war. He
comes from a well-known ecclesiastical family of Tehran. The general effect of
German broadcasts in Persian is not yet apparent.
(ii) The Delhi broadcast in Kabuli Persian is well received in Tehran.
8. Japanese Interests.
r I he Japanese firm of Mitsui is negotiating for the sale of a number of dual
control instructional aircraft for the Aero Club of Iran.
9. United States Interests.
(i) Dr. Schmidt, of the Chicago University Expedition at Persepolis, is now
closing down and has presented the aeroplane belonging to the expedition to the
Aero Club of Iran. The machine is a four-seater “ Waco ' 1935 model, fitted
with one 225 h.p. Jacobs engine. It has not been flown for some time. The
Aero Club have accepted the gift with great satisfaction.
(ii) The Iranian Government have tried unsuccessfully to raise loans in the
United States for 15 million dollars.
10. Tribal Unrest.
The Turkomans in general, whether on the Russian or Persian side of the
border, are bitterly hostile to the Soviet regime. Many of those who fled to Iran
have been treated little better than those remaining in Soviet Turkestan, and a
number of them have as a result returned to their homes. It is considered that,
if the Soviet were to attempt any aggression against Iran, Turkomans in Russia
w T ould immediately revolt and endeavour to throw off the Bolshevik yoke. Their
fellow tribesmen in Iran would only be too ready to help them.
11. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Consular reports from Ahwaz state that on receipt of the world-wide warning
telegram of possible German sabotage of oil plants, the Abadan executive held a
conference at which the conclusions arrived at were :—
(i) The oil company had to rely on the Iranian authorities in Khuzistan
and Kermanshah for surveillance and exclusion of potential agents,
(ii) That precautions against the entry of agents into the refinery area were
to be increased.
(iii) That Amnieh (road guards) were to he asked to guard vulnerable points
along the pipe-line and refinery.
Two hundred extra Amnieh guards were accordingly applied for. A list of
vulnerable points was also supplied to the authorities, and a request made that
detectives should be stationed at Bandar Shahpur and along the railway and pipe
line to prevent enemy agents approaching Abadan across country.
At the outbreak of war it was reported, and later confirmed, that the military
and police authorities in Khuzistan and Kermanshah had taken up immediate
dispositions to guard the oil plant {vide military attach^, Tehran, telegrams
Nos. 47 and 49, addressed to all concerned). It would, therefore, appear that the
oil company executives had originally not worked out a scheme in collaboration
with the civil authorities, or if there was a scheme it was unsatisfactory, or that
the precautions had been relaxed.
The Abadan manager of the oil company received news of this world-wide
warning from four sources, viz., Senior Naval Officer—A.I.O.C.. head office
Bagdad and military attach^, Tehran, through chief manager.
12. German Propaganda.
Recently leaflets in English have been distributed by the German Consulate
at Tabriz. These leaflets, printed in Germany, are as follows :—
“ Hitler’s would-be assassin caught.”
“Adolf Hitler’s speech in the Burgesbraukeller.”
“British preparations for starving out Germany.”