'Military report on Tehran and adjacent Provinces of North-West Persia (including the Caspian Littoral)' [‎21r] (46/610)

29
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On the 17th June the ex-Shah with a few followers suddenly RebeMon of ex,
and unexpectedly landed at Ghumish Tappeh, in an attempt galar-ud-
to recover the throne, and Salar-ud-Dauleh, his brother, also Dauleh, 1911,
raised the standard of rebellion on his behalf at Senneh in
Kurdistan.
Muhammad All’s adventure was thwarted by the incapacity
and indecision which distinguished all his undertakings, and
its history is narrated in para. 5 below under the heading of
Mazandaran. The menace from Mazandaran was ended by
the defeat of Arshad-ud-Dauleh in Varamin on 5th September.
Simultaneously operations were in progress against Salar-ud-
Dauleh, who had seized Kirmanshah and was rumoured to
have collected a force of 10,000 men.
^y 23 rd of August he had advanced from Kirmanshah to
the South of Hamadan, had driven or frightened away all oppo
sition and himself appeared as a Pretender to the throne. No
force remained to bar his progress to Tehran. A mixed body
of 1,200 Bakhtiaris and Armenians, however, was hurriedly
raised, a d joined a loyalist detachment which had retired from
Sultanabad in ‘Iraq’ to Qum, and met and defeated 4,000
rebels at Bagh-i-Shah near Saveh. Salar-ud-Dauleh, who was
awaiting the result of the fray at Nubaran, fled by Hamadan
to Burujird in Luristan and his following of tribesmen dispersed.
The tide of rebellion was consequently checked, largely
owing to the efforts of Mr. Shuster to provide money, and to the
personality of Yeprim, who was the heart and soul of the opposi
tion. It had, however, grievously embarrassed the struggling
constitutional Government, and accentuated its hatred and
mistrust of Russia. The ex-Shah had been exiled to an asylum
in European Russia and the Russian Government was conse
quently blamed 1 for his return.
The Russian and British Legations had protected the ex-
Shah on his deposition and conducted negotiations with the
revolutionaries to settle his pension and remove him to Russia,
but made no energetic pronouncement against his rebellion and
* The question whether the Russian Government did or did not connive at
his return to Persia is very obscure. It appears that they must have been aware
that it was impending, but the fact thatdn June 1911 they had sold arms and
ammunition to the Persian Government, without which they could never have
put downlthe rebellion, points to the fact that at any rate they had not long
foreknowledge. Probably the Russian Government was aware that Muhammad
All was plotting and remained benevolently neutral by not discouraging him
or warning the frontier authorities to he on the alert. Russian subordinate
officials must have assisted him, as otherwise he could never have travelled
across Russia taking munitions and stores to Baku. In Persia the Russian Lega
tion remained neutral, hut Russian Consuls aided him and Russian opinion in.
Tehran unanimously hoped he would succeed. The alienation of Russian sym- *
pathy from the “ Constitutionalists ” and their pique at the appointment and
work of Mr. Shuster are sufficient to account for this attitude.