Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎365r] (729/749)

British Embassy,
TEHRAN.
(zgs)
V
S E
J
16th December, 19^-5
MILITARY ATTACHE ’ s
INTELLIGENCE SIBC'ARY No. kB
FOR THE PER IOD 10 th DECKER TO 16th DECEMBER 194-5
PERSIAN AFFAIRS.
Political
1
During the past week events in Azerbaijan have moved rapidly to
their inevitable conclusion and have fulfilled to a remarkable degree the prediction
of H.M. Consul-General at Tabriz recorded in para 12 of Intelligence Summary No.4-5*
They are described in para 8 below. The first round has gone to the rebels and,
for the time being at least, Azerbaijan is in the Russian bag,.
2
Meanwhile, in Tehran, certain actions by the Prime ''inister have
tended to estrange still further the Majlis Majority which supported him. These
actions are four in number. Firstly the Prime Minister refuses to take the
Majlis sufficiently into his confidence and, in reply to numerous questions,
merely replies that active steps to end the deadlock are being taken. Even the
cabinet would appear not to have been consulted in some of his decisions. Secondly
he has convened a ’high council' of elder statesmen. That this council is
entirely unofficial has been stressed but, all the same, their reputations and
political leanings do not inspire confidence among the advocates of resistance. The
Qawam-us-Saltaneh, who has vast estates in the I ussian zone and whose candidature
for the Premiership the Russian controlled press has long been advocating, makes no
secret' of his belief in a policy of appeasement in general and, in particular, of
granting an oil concession to the Russians, of removi-ng, x^^ioials obnoxious to -tho
Russians and in holding the elections, for the next Majlis on thu original
of the postponed date. Mushtashfiuvud-Dowleh is a tool of the Tudeh and -closely
related to the leader of the rebels v/ho staged the disturhanres in Zenjan. Ali
Mansur (Mansur-us-Saltan^h),though intelligent and able, has a dubious record'as
Governor-General in Meshed where H.M. Consul-General recently described him as-
"either the Retain or the Quisling of Khorasan'. Pirnia, though honest, is far
advanced in senility. Baha-ul-Mulk Qaragazlu is inept and foolish. It was
inevitable that the selection of such men by the ^rime Minister as his unofficial
advisers should arouse mistrust. Thirdly, without informing H. I.M.The Shah or
the British or American Ambassadors, the Prime Minister has suggested to the Soviet
Government through the Persian Ambassador in Moscov/ that he and the Minister for
Foreign Affairs .should go to Moscow "for converse.tions". The possible consequences
of this are obvious and would provide justification for the Russian view, so often
expressed in the Moscow press and in the Russian controlled Persian press, that the
Azerbaijan affair is a domestic one between Russia and Persia and should hot be
raised to the status of an international issue. Realizing how greatly this direct
approach will have weakened the position of the British and American Secretaries of
State, H.I.M.The Shah prevailed upon the ^rime Minister to retrieve his mistake, as
far as-possible, by making a public appeal to the three powers to remove their
troops from Persia immediately and by addressing a request to the three governments
that Persia should be represented, in virtue of Article 6 of the Tripartite Treaty,
at any discussions in Moscow affecting Persia. Fourthly, in his desire to
avoid any action provocative to the Russians, the Prime Minister, against the advice