Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎335r] (669/749)

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October 1, 1945.
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Section 1.
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Copy No.
Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No. 37, Secret, for the Period
YJth September to 23rd September, {Communicated in Tehran
despatch No. 336 of 2Mh September; Received in Foreign Office,
ls£ October.)
Persian Affairs.
The Majlis.
1. No business of any importance has been done during the past week. At
the session of the 16th September the debate on the Two-Twelfths Budget Bill
was resumed but was not concluded. On the 18th September there was no public
session as the Prime Minister had asked the Speaker to convene a special joint
meeting of the Majlis Budget and Foreign Affairs Commissions to discuss ways
and means for the transference of American military assets in Peisia to the
Persian Government. Representatives of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs,
Roads and Communications and Finance also attended this meeting. On the
19th September the Majlis met but rose on account of there being no quorum.
On the 20th September the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement in
amplification of his recent note to the British, Russian and American Embassies
on the subject of the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops (see paragraph 2 of
last Intelligence Summarv). In replv to criticism of his note he explained that,
in giving the 2nd March, 1946, as the date by which the evacuation of Persia
must be completed, he wished to establish that date as legally collect. His
Government did not wish to convey the impression that they were willing to
see the Allied occupation of Persia continue up to that date. On the contrary,
the Persian Government regarded it as an essential preliminary to the return
to normality that the evacuation should be begun as speedily as possible and
concluded, if possible, before that date.
Political.
2. There is some evidence to show that the Majlis majority does not intend
to keep Sadr in office indefinitely but that it is wise enough to realise that a
change of premiership during the present crisis would be a very dangerous step.
The name of Hakim-ul-Mulk is again being mentioned as a possible successor
to Sadr.
3. Growing anxiety is felt in political and ministerial circles at the lack
of news from London about the decisions taken at the Foreign Secretaries
Conference in respect of the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops. The Persians,
dilatory in expediting other people’s business, invariably give the highest priority
to their own and cannot understand why their own particular problem was not
put down as No. 1 on the agenda. A telegram, alleged to have been sent by the
Persian Ambassador in London, to the effect that the London press, in publishing
the agenda of the conference, had made no mention of Persia, contributed to the
general feeling of suspense. More recently a message from Reuters alluding
to a rumour current in London that the Russians might possibly ask for the
separation of Azerbaijan from Persia has added to this consternation.
The Tudeh.
4. The stock of the Tudeh party in Tehran has slumped during the past
week. The reasons are :—
(i) The closing of the Tudeh party offices by the Military Governor;
(ii) the suppression of some of the Tudeh papers;
(iii) the injuries sustained in a scuffle with the military by Dr. Kishawarz,
the Tudeh leader;
(iv) the communique issued by the Chief of the General Staff on the recent
mutiny in the Persian army in which Tudeh complicity is made
amply clear;
[70—103]
B