Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎246v] (492/749)

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Even in this atmosphere an amicable solution of the oil question could have?
been reached—had not the statements of Kavtaradzeh and the anti-Sa’ed
agitation of Tudeh demonstrators and the Russian-backed press deliberately
exacerbated the situation. Kavtaradzeh, whose intentions were good, was not
of reality to blame. He was misled by the Soviet Embassy and the Tudeh. Still,^*^ 4 .
his statement was inconsistent with common courtesy and international rights.
He had no legal power to break off diplomatic relations. We realised that the
Soviets had the power to bully us; but we could not suppose that a Government
professing the principles of Lenin would support its Embassy in humiliating us ;
especially after our sacrifices on its behalf.
Sa’ed’s only fault was trust in the Soviet Government and in Stalin’s
declaration, made at Tehran. He was not discourteous, much less criminal.
He did his duty. But the demonstrators against him on the 27th October were
protected by Russian machine-guns—not only in Tehran. Telegrams to our
representatives abroad, telling them of our humiliation, were held up by the
Allied censorship. We realised that we had lost our independence. Sa’ed stood
firm : but the shameful behaviour of our Allies drove him to resign. The heart
breaking letter of resignation should be read to future generations in Persian
schools.
The base, unfounded calumny of accusing certain people of enmity to Soviet-
Persian friendship is the result of bad advice given to Soviet representatives in
Persia by a handful of Persian traitors : their object being to save the face of
the Soviet officials who had blundered.
As to the points of Kavtaradzeh’s statement—
( 1 ) It is no business of a foreigner to point out the mistakes of the Majlis;
which is alone competent and independent.
(2) The Majlis was compelled by the threats and other mistakes of Soviet
representatives in Persia to ban future oil conversations. Still, I had
myself wished for the Oil Law to remain valid .only for so long as
Allied armies remained on Persian soil.
(3) Foreign concessions already existed at the time of the r I reaty of the
24th February, 1921, and the southern oil concession still exists. So
long as Allied representatives are prepared to honour the Tehran
declaration they have no right to put forward interpretations or
alterations detrimental to Persian sovereignty.
( 4 ) The Majlis decision was not a mistake: whether some day it may be
revised depends on whether Soviet representatives change their policy
of interference. It will not be revised so long as a single foreign
soldier remains on Persian soil, nor while the fate of Cabinets depends
not on the Majlis and the Shah but on foreign Embassies and synthetic
demonstrations.
Our first duty is to clarify our external relations, which is impossible without
a Government which will stand up to foreigners, invite foreign Governments to
withdraw their troops and refuse to tolerate interference. A declaration should
be issued that, if our relations are not clarified soon, the capital will be transferred
elsewhere.
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill have the right to know what their
representatives, the interpreters of their declaration, are doing in Persia. The
aggressors rely on force, tyranny and military supremacy; Persia on right and
justice. A definite date should be fixed for the departure of all foreign troops.
This is possible only through a Government which will maintain both the integrity
of Persia and the best possible relations with the U.S.S.R. The present
Government cannot.