Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎229r] (457/749)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
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-November 25. 1944.
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Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.
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Copy No
.127
(No. 439.) \%C>
HIS Majesty’s representative presents his compliments to His Majesty’s
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit
herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the period of the
6th November to 12th November, 1944, compiled by the military attache to this
legation.
Tehran, IMh November, 1944.
Enclosure.
Military Attache’s Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the Period
Mh-lMh November, 1944.
(Secret.)
Persian Affairs.
Political.
SA’EI) and his Cabinet have resigned. The Russians having to all
appearances dropped their demand for an oil concession—In fact, going so far
as to pretend that that demand never was the important matter at issue but only
Sa’ed’s persistently anti-Russian policy—those timorous people, who include the
Shah, his intimate advisers, with the exception of the Minister of the Court and
many Deputies, who feared that their private interests might be affected by the
prolongation of the crisis in Russo-Persian relations and who desired a concilia
tory gesture that would make it possible for the Russians to re-establish relations
with the Persian Government, prevailed on Sa’ed to resign.
2. Unless the Russians are very ill-informed, they must know that by his
refusal of their demand Sa’ed has greatly increased his prestige and is, in fact,
j a minor national hero; not only that, but that Persian opinion was for the most
part strongly opposed to the grant of a concession to the Soviet Government;
that world opinion has not been misled b)^ the artificial demonstration of hirelings,
nor by the inspired clamour of a certain section of the press; and that not only
have they had a considerable rebuff, but also that the Tudeh party is greatly
discredited, having plainly shown itself to all to be nothing more than an
organisation for the furtherance of Soviet policy in Persia. Moreover, the
leaders of the party have realised that their Russian connexion is no guarantee
of security; the leading papers of the party have been suppressed, its head
quarters occupied by Persian troops and some of the leaders arrested. Persians
may well wonder what services the Soviet Ambassador and the Deputy Commissar
for Foreign Affairs have rendered to Russia to merit the decorations whose award
to them has recently been announced.
3. In broadcasts from Moscow, in the Russian press and in the Russian-
inspired Persian press malignant attacks on Sa’ed continued. The similarity
of the articles in the Russian and Persian press left no doubt as to their common
origin. They included a certain amount of propaganda to the effect that it was
only to Russia that the Persian people could look with confidence for protection
against colonising Powers and against exploitation. The Izvestiya gave as proof
of Sa’ed’s treachery to his country that he allowed American troops to remain
in Persia without any treaty right whatsoever. Reuter’s and the B.B.C. were
attacked for attempting to mislead world opinion by suggesting that Sa’ed had
the support of public opinion in Persia. Certain Persian papers ventured to
‘[60-24]