Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎225v] (450/749)

FT:
2
‘ now find cause for more confidence in the future since they hold the view that
even the common people are being antagonised by Russia's obvious attempts to
bully.
3. In his interview with the journalists—referred to in paragraph 1—
Kavtaradzeh stated :—■
(a) That the Soviet Government wished to obtain a concession for the
exploration for oil in the provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan,
part of the region of Semnan and some parts of Khorassan.
(b) After the necessary surveys had been made in this area to establish where
oil existed, the concession would be restricted to a definitely limited
region. (It is known from other sources that this area may extend
to 150,000 square kilom.)
(c) The Soviet Government would pay royalties according to production and
a sum to be agreed upon in lieu of customs dues, and would supply
Persia’s needs in oil products.
(d) At the end of the period of the concession all constructions and installa
tions would be surrendered to the Persian Government.
(e) Employment would be found for thousands of Persian workmen, particu
larly for those who had helped in the transport of supplies to Russia.
(/) Persians would be trained in all the technical branches of oil production.
(g) During the preliminary geological survey it might be expected that other
mineral resources would be discovered which would be of benefit to
Persia.
(h) The Soviet Government would accept responsibility for the medical care
of all employees and their families.
(f) The Prime Minister in preliminary discussions had expressed his
approval in principle of the Soviet proposals. His subsequent refusal
to grant any concessions for oil until after the war had been badly
received by the Soviet authorities and his attitude would lead to a
deterioration in Russo-Persian relations.
4. Elsewhere the Russians have accused the Prime Minister of having been
aware of the purpose of Kavtaradzeh’s mission and of having approved of it
before his arrival in Persia. It is believed that the explanation given by the
Soviet Embassy of the object of Kavtaradzeh’s mission when it was first proposed
to the Persian Government was that it was to discuss the old Khurian oil
concession in which the Soviet Government had some share, and to obtain
information about mines m North Persia. The Prime Mhmster, m an interview
given to the press, stated that this was his understanding and that as soon as
the matter of a new concession was mentioned he had informed Kavtaradzeh
that the Government had already decided to give no concessions until after
the war.
5. The press states that the American Ambassador has written to the
Pei sian Government confirming that no promise of a concession had been given
to the representative of any American oil company, and that he considered that
the Persian Government was fully justified in postponing a decision until after
the war.
6. Dr. Millspaugh has apparently refused to accept the decision of the
Government that his dismissal of the Governor of the National Bank was ultra
vires as, subsequent to that decision, he notified all other banks and departments
of the Government that Ibtehaj’s signature on official documents was not valid.
7. Hassan Taqizadeh, Persian Ambassador in London, has left Tehran
on his return to England. Attacks on him continued in the Soviet inspired press
up to the time of his departure.
8. Majid Ahi, Persian Ambassador in Moscow, has arrived in Tehran on
a visit.
9. The Minister of Roads and Communications, Mahmoud Nariman has
resigned as a protest against the Prime Minister’s decision that M Hussein
Nafisi, who had been dismissed from the post of Director-General of Railwavs
should be reinstated. ^ ’
Persian Forces.
A rmy.
10. The Bill for the grant of an additional credit of 15 million tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. to
the army was passed by a substantial majqrity. An addition made to the Bill
was that the period of service for graduates and licentiates should be reduced
to one year (see also Summary No. 40/44, paragraph 6)