Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎220r] (439/749)

A THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC
^PERSIA.
SECRET.
JESTY’S GOVERNMENT
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October 27, 1944.
Section 1 .
A
Copy No. j Q
for foreign r,i.—• | rr
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[E 0593/ 422/ 34] ^ ^
Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.-^-(Received 27th October)
(No. 399.) ’
t, • I ? IS 1 ^ a j est y’ s representative presents his compliments to His Maiesty’s
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit
herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the period the 9 th-
15th October, 1944, compiled by the military attache to this legaiion.
Tehran, l§th October, 1944.
Enclosure.
Military Attache s Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the period, the Qth-
15th October, 1944.
Persian Affairs.
(Secret.)
Political.
1. The Russian demand for a concession for the right to explore for oil in
ISorth Persia dominates the political mind of the capital. The effects on Persia’s
integrity of the political results that would follow on the invasion of the area in
question, which extends from Azerbaijan to Quchan, by an army of Soviet
Government officials in the guise of technical experts occupying the places left
vacant on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, are widely appreciated; and there is
fairly general approval of the Government’s reply to the Soviet representative,
Kavtaradzeh, to the effect that it had been decided to postpone decision on the
several applications for concessions for the exploitation of oil until after the war.
There are, however, not a few who regard this defiance as dangerous temerity,
likely to provoke disagreeable retaliation, a fear which Soviet officials have not
failed, to exploit; and in the press there is not only an absence of the hostile
criticism that was directed against the British and American competitors for
concessions but, in certain ‘papers supported by the Russians or inspired for the
occasion, much argument as to the necessity for restoring the balance in foreign
relations, upset by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s concession in the south, by
granting to the Russians a concession in the north; other articles, clearly not
written by Persians, would represent the Russian demand as having been dictated
not at all in the interests of Russia, Russia having no need of more oil, but solely
by the Soviet Government’s generous desire to do good to Persia by helping her
to develop her resources and to provide profitable employment for her people;
others, again, accuse the Persian Government of having been actuated by hostility
to Russia in their decision, since they had been considering for months past
applications for concessions from British and American companies without
coming to the conclusion that a reply should be deferred until after the war.
2 . It is possible that laqizadeh, the Persian A.mbassador m London now on
a visit to Tehran, may become Prime Minister in the near future. He is held in
good repute in the country; but his reputation is founded on his career of some
years past, since when he has been absent from Persia. His appointment would,
it seems, be unwelcome to the Russians since their subsidised Persian press is now
warning the public that he has been brought to Persia by the same influences that
brought Seyyid Zia to serve the purpose in which they now realise that Seyyid Zia
cannot succeed. Taqizadeh has a reputation for patriotism, and he would not be
as compliant with Russian desires in such matters as oil concessions as their
candidate for the premiership, Qavam es Sultaneh.
[59—28]
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