Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎166v] (332/749)

Persian Forces.
A rmy.
7. Without consulting the Chief of Staff the Shah ordered certain changes
in military appointments, which are detailed in paragraph 11 below. The result
is the removal from the Ministry of War and from the command of the
1st Division of two supporters of the Chief of Staff and of the American
military mission and their relegation to less important positions. Into the
Ministry of War is now introduced an officer who, together with General Razmara
of the Shah’s military secretariat, has for some time past been in close contact
with the Russians and who is regarded in the army as the Russians’ man. He
is perhaps only so to the extent that he hopes for Russian support against the
American advisers, of whom he has always disapproved.
8. These appointments will undoubtedly be interpreted as an indication of
Russian influence in the army and of the Shah’s intention to acquiesce in Russian
opposition to the American advisers. One object is probably to force the resigna
tion of General Riazi, the Chief of Staff. The Shah has already informed His
Majesty’s Embassy that he wishes to replace him by General Yazdan Panah and
was told that in the opinion of His Majesty’s Embassy he would be ill-advised
to do so. General Yazdan Panah showed few good qualities except financial
honesty and some ineffective patriotism during his previous tenure of the appoint
ment of Chief of Staff. He makes no concealment of his disagreement with the
plans of the American advisers and he has always maintained that Persia needs
an army in present circumstances of at least 110,000.
9. The Shah has again been expressing to the Chief of Staff his discontent
with the American Military Mission. The real cause of his discontent probably
is that General Ridley does not champion vis-a-vis Dr. Millspaugh the cause
of a large army.
10. General Ridley says that the American Government has agreed to send
nine more officers for his mission, making twenty in all.
A ppointments — Military.
11. —(i) Sartip Ansari (Ghulam Ali) from Under-Secretary of State in the
Ministry for War to be Director of the Military Tribunals (Judge
Advocate General’s) Department of the Army.
(ii) Sartip Abdullah Hidayet from Commandant of the Officers’ Cadet
School to be Under-Secretary of State for War;
(iii) Sartip Hassan Arfa (F.0.30, M.A. 37) from command of the
1st Division to be Commandant of the Officers’ Cadet School;
(iv) Sarlashkar Shaqaqi (Hadi) F.O. 196, M.A. 270) from Director of
Military Tribunals to command the 1st Division.
Internal Security.
Fars.
12. General Jahanbani has been in Tehran discussing the situation in Fars.
He has given to the Government his definite opinion that negotiation will not
secure the submision of Nasir Qashgai. Plans for military operations were
discussed with the Minister for War and Chief of Staff. Morteza Quli Khan,
the Governor of Bakhtiari, was asked if Bakhtiari co-operation against the
Qashgai could be counted on and he replied, “ Only to the extent of benevolent
neutrality.” It was decided that the spring was not a suitable occasion for
military action against the tribes; the summer, when the tribes were settled in
their summer quarters, offered more favourable opportunities. It is understood
that the Shah has approved in principle that operations for the disarmament
i of the Qashgai should take place in the summer. There is little chance of this
I happening.
13. The choice of a Governor-General to succeed Qavam ul Mulk in Shiraz
has not yet been made. Farajullah Bahrami—see Summary No. 6/44, para
graph 9—like Qavam ul Mulk, has demanded authority and a free hand to an
extent which the Government is unwilling to give.
Kuh i Gain.
14. It is unlikely that any military operations will take place for the
disarmament of Bahmai—see Summary No. 6/44, paragraph 12. Morteza Quli
Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, may be allowed to try and, see what he can do
with his political influence with some troops in the background.
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