File 705/1916 Pt 1 'Arab revolt: reports' [‎320v] (188/494)

Soudan had been forbidden; and, though for political reasons a formal
proclamation Of a “ blockade " was not made, informal warnings were
disseminated broadcast to the following effect:—
“A year ago Great Britain, always the friend of Islam, was induced by
pity to raise the blockade of Jeddah and Hejaz. But she has found that by
this means food has been going to the enemy. Therefore she is compelled
to prevent all supplies from entering Hejaz by sea ; after loth May all dhows
found on the sea will be seized or sunk. Great Britain still retains her
friendship for the Arabs ; they will know who is the cause of their trouble.”
In spite of this announcement great care was taken at lirst not to punish
unoffending fishing craft and the like till the warning had been widely
spread.
To facilitate the carrying out of the patrol scheme, the French and
Italian authorities were asked to substitute steamer for dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. traffic to Geiza.
The only neutral country much concerned was Holland; provisional
arrangements were made to allow her traffic to pass, but the naval authorities
are now taking steps to find out whether there is any plan afoot to send
supplies from the Dutch East Indies.
On the 24th May, a message was received from the Sherif, presumably in
answer to the letter of 8th May, outlined above. It came by wireless through
the agent who went with the first consignment of supplies.
In this message Abdullah, the Sherif’s second son, asked Mr. Storrs to
meet him on the Arabian coast. 'The Sherif asked for a further remittance
of 50,000L and Abdullah 10,0001. Feisal, the Sherif said, was expected
shortly in Mecca, and the revolt would then begin. He also asked for
Faruki, whose presence he said would be of the greatest value if he could be
sent.
Prompt action has been taken in answer to this message. On the 28th
May Mr. Storrs, accompanied by members of the Arab Bureau, left for Port
Soudan; there they have arranged to pick up the Sherif’s messenger; they
will then proceed to the Hejaz coast and interview Abdullah. They have
taken with them 10,0001. for Abdullah, and the British Government have
approved of a further advance to the Sherif of 50,000/., preferably in
instalments, provided that Mr. Storrs’report is favourable and that a real
rising begins.
The mission will try to give Abdullah a true conception of the military
situation, to discover the exact intentions and position of the Sherif, and
explain away any suspicions that may exist as to the future of Syria.
Arrangements have been made to send Faruki to Port Soudan at the
earliest opportunity. His military knowledge will, it is realized, be a
valuable asset, and he will form a reliable channel for military intelligence.
The last information from the Sherif has come through his trusted
messenger Mohammed Areifan (Orayfan), who reached Port Soudan on the
27th May. Areifan brought with him cordial messages and a letter from
the Sherif to the effect that everything was ready for a rising, that Feisal
was expected soon, and that Faruki would, if he came, be sent to Mecca
Areifan brought also a letter from Abdullah to Mr. Storrs, in which the
imminence of the revolt was confirmed. And lastly he brought a verbal
message from the Sherif leiteratmg lus need of money, and stating, first
that he had made all arrangements for Mr. Storrs’ visit; secondly, that seven
Germans had already been killed near Jeddah ; thirdly, that the Turks in
Syria had discovered his plans, and that Feisal had been recalled in conse
quence ; fourthly, that as a result the revolt must begin at once ; and. lastly,
that he had sent a message to All Dinar, the Darfur Sultan urgmcr him to
make peace with Great Britain.
The crux of the whole matter will soon be reached. By the middle of
May a considerable quantity of stores and ammunition had reached the
Hejaz coast in safety. I he sole matter of regret was our inability to provide
the Martini-Henry ammunition required, only Japanese rifles and ammunition
being available. 'Ihis was unfortunate because the Sherif’s tribesmen are
doubtless already armed, like most Arabs, with Martini-Henry carbines, and
Aiabs, who nevei take any care of their arms, will have no hesitation in
forcing any ammunition they can get into their rifles.