File 705/1916 Pt 1 'Arab revolt: reports' [‎296r] (139/494)

The Imam Ls reported by the Sherif to be doing nothing. Aden reports
that his feud with the Tdrisi is irreeuneilable, and urges an attack on the
Turks at Lahej. -See under “ Aden.”
A SIR.
77m Idrisi.
The Idrisi was, previous to the revolt, uncertain. He was inactive, but
the Sherif described his attitude as “ satisfactory.”
Since then he seems to have made up his mind. On llthJune Aden
announced that he was willing to take offensive action against the Turks as
soon as he was convinced of the truth of the Sherif s revolt, and on the 14th
that he had given a definite promise, in view of the Sherif’s offensive, to
attack the Turkish posts in Asia. With the Imam of Yemen, however, he
still seems irreconcilable.
I Infill id and Bah d Tribes.
The Hashid and llakil have remained friendly towards Aden. They are
strongly anti-Turk and an attempt is being made through the Idrisi to
secure their active support.
llm Saud and Tim Rashid.
The Sherif s last message describes Ibn Sand’s attitude as satisfactory.
Since his expedition against flail lie seems to have done nothing.
Ibn Rashid, on the other hand, has been on the move continually. From
Arkhamish, where he was recently, he went to Abu Ghar (15 miles west of
Khamsieh), thence to fvasr Birshagrah (20 miles south of Khamsieh), from
there to Safwan (20 miles south of Zobeir, between Basra and Koweit).
A special messenger, sent to ask him his intentions, found him at Safwan
on 10th J une. 1 ie had with him 600 men, of whom half were camel sowars,
and half horsemen, lie openly confessed that he was a Turkish subject,
and in Turkish pay, and said that he could not, therefore, communicate with
the British authorities in writing. His movements, he said, were due to
Turkish orders, for they had told him to harass the British force as best he
could. If Turkish troops approached Zobeir, he said, he would at once join
them ; otherwise he had no intention of moving. He claimed as the price
of this abstention the right to send his caravans to the British markets at
Zobeir ; otherwise he would do his utmost to make a nuisance of himself
whenever possible. .
The answer sent to him was to the following effect: that il he would
withdraw to Arkhamieh, reasonable facilities would be given him for sending
caravans to Zobeir. But that no caravan would be admitted till he has
actually reached Arkhamieh, and then only so long as he abstained from
anv unfriendlv action against the British forces. He was advised to move
as soon as possible, as otherwise British cavalry might come into contact with
his fighting men. . , , 1 ,
On receipt of this message Ibn Rashid adopted a truculent attitude and
refused to move from his camp, till a column of all arms was organised
against him at Zobeir, upon which he hastily decamped westwards. JSq
attempt has been made to follow him up. . . , ;
It seems not impossible that the Turks may have some scheme m mmd
for attacking Basra from the west, in conjunction with Ibn hashid or
the bearing of this it is necessary to recall the events preceding the hast j
battle of Shaiba.
ADEN.
The following is a precis of a reportfrom the General Officer Commanding, /
Aden, dated 13th May 1916. i i • u, \ r m 71
The following four courses of action appear possible m the Aden j
region :—
J. To
remain on the passive defence in
Sheikh Otliman, as at present.
Aden with a covering force at