File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎220r] (437/450)

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We have it now in our power to instil this same loyalty and affection into the
Jieaits ol millions ol Arabs, l^et ns not miss the opportunity.
Uwldiam, Hants, (Signed) 0. H. Powell,
^ 'thJtdy 1.916. Major-General.
^ote on the foregoincj proposals by D. 8. Margoliouth, D. Lilt., F.B.A.
The general wisdom of these proposals will, I think, be clear to students of
Islamic History and politics, from tlio following’ considerations *
. L The custody of the Sanctuaries, Mecca and Medina, is a matter of the utmost
importance tor the Islamic communities. The transference of it from an unfriendly
to a friendly Power must be highly beneficial to the Allies, who, between them
protect a large proportion, perhaps five-sixths, of the Mahommedan population of the
y 01 ; 1 ?- yommon hostility to the Turk forms, at any rate for the time, a natural bond
Ol mendship between the Allies and the Sherif.
2. Although the religions headship of Islam has at times been usurped by
dynasties unconnected with the Prophet’s family, attachment to that family has
always been a poweriul motive m the Moslem mind. It seems likely that any loyalty
to the Park is h Caliph which may linger in the breasts of the Mahommedan 'subiects
of.the Allies would be counteracted by the knowledge that they were fighting for the
recovery of supremacy in Arabia and at the Sanctuaries to a descendant of the
Prophet, and indeed a descendant whose pedigree is well attested.
d. I he relations between Arabs and Turks, which have rarely been cordial,
appeal to have been more than ever strained since the proclamation of the Ottoman
Constitution, and the attitude adopted by the \oung Turkish Party. In June 1913
an Aiabian Congress was held in Paris, representing an endeavour to consolidate the
interests of the Arabic-speaking countries. It seems likely that the secure possession
of the Sanctuaries by an Arab potentate would cause the loyalty of the Moslems of
Syria and Mesopotamia to gravitate in his direction.
4. Phe consciousness ol the fact that the policy of the pro-German party in Turkey
has led to the permanent loss of the Sanctuaries should lead to the discredit and
downfall of that party, and more than counteract the effect of the Turkish successes
in the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia. For this reason efforts that can be made to
secure the Sherif in his occupation are likely to lead to the speedy elimination of the
Turk as a combatant.
5. Evidence is now before the world of the almost avowed hostility of the German
Government to Islam. It seems clear that such a mission as is contemplated by
General Powell would be of great use to the Sherif in furnishing him with material
for his proclamations, which might then be circulated among the Moslem subjects of
the Allies and their brethren elsewhere with the approval of their religions leaders.
(). I he record of the Sherif for competence as a ruler and negotiator would seem
(from occasional notices in the Cairene Mahommedan monthly Manar) to be good. V
Some account of this should be compiled for the instruction of those who have not
followed the internal politics of Arabia in recent times.
Oxford,
13th duly 1916,
Dear General Powell,
With reference to the comments you have asked me to make
Memorandum on “ The Rebellion of the Great Sherif of Mecca against the
Young Turk.'’
R.G.S.,
12th July,
upon your
Rule of the
I quite agree with you that the questions of the Caliphate, the backing of the
Sherif of Mecca, and the future of Arabia, are questions demanding the most urgent
and careful consideration. The unsatisfactory state of affairs in those regions has
been disregarded far too long. The immense latent powers of the Arab people, the
far-reaching spiritual prestige held rightly by the Sherif but usurped by the Ottomans,
and especially the “ politico-strategic ” importance of the Arabian pemnsula, in my
opinion, have not received the attention and consideration they demanded as a potent
factor in the war.