File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎202v] (402/450)

next morning, and Sherif Nazir at once went on shore with the interpreter, but, after
going a few yards, the latter was sent back. He was told that 9,000 Arabs had come
down to oppose the landing; that there were four Turks in the town, and that had he
gone on he would certainly have been killed. Sherif Nazir did not return till 7 p.m.
when he said that Sheikh Hussein had objected to his landing because an officer had A
told the reis of a dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. that the troops would be landed by force. This was obvioudv ^
^ ' J .li v • i , i i it
untrue. Sherif Nazir requested that the supplies might be landed and the batteries
remain on board until he had communicated with the Sherifs Feisal and Ali. This
would take at least four days. Major Pearson, in consequence of the attitude of the
Arabs and of representations made by the Egyptian officers on board, recommended
that the troops should be returned to Jeddah, and in this Colonel Wilson concurred.
The blame for this unfortunate incident—and it was doubly unfortunate owino 1 to the
urgent need of the supplies at Medina—rest primarily with the Sherif for neglectino- to
warn Sheikh Hussein Mubeiriq, although Colonel Wilson had several times asked ^him
to do so. Bad Sherif Nazir arrived in the first ship matters might have been arranged,
but as it was a whole day passed, during which the interpreter picked up various
alarming rumours from irresponsible people, which he spread broadcast through the
ship. Sheikh Hussein Mabeiriq is supreme in his own territory, and has always been
independent of the Sherif. He obviously did not want the troops, and Sherif Nazir’s
request for a delay of four days was evidently in order that he might find out where
else they would be landed.
On the morning of the 1st July I went ashore to pay a call on Sherif Mohsin Ibn
Mansur el Kanmi, the military governor of the town, who had arrived from Mecca the
day before. The whole town was asleep, it being the first day of Ramadan. After
bemg kept waiting for some time, I was shown upstairs and found him lying on a divan
suffering from a high Aver. I therefore cut short my visit and merely gave him a
message from Colonel Wilson about the happening at Rabegh. He asked me to inform
the Sherif by telephone, which I did. _ The Sherif seemed to attach little importance to
the incident, and said that Sherif Nazir would put things right when he arrived. Sherif
Mohsin is a very fine type of Arab, tall and straight, with piercing grey eyes and' a black
beard streaked with grey. He gives one a greater impression of strength and
Soon after my return to the ship, Sheikh Ahmed Talaat, the clerk of Sherif Mohsin
came on board and said that he had received a telephone message from the Sherif to
ie fhect that too large a number of men had been going on shore from the ships, that
the inhabitants were upset, and that he must therefore request that no one should land
except the captain, Colonel Wilson, and myself, and then only when we had business.
We informed him that the Sherif’s instructions would be observed, and that we
ourselves wished to go ashore early next morning about the Rabegh affair. He
accordingly promised to send horses to meet us and departed. Faroki, who had been
summoned by the Sherif, returned presently and repeated the order, but said that it
applied to all of us, and not only to the ships’ crews. I insisted on his giving me a
written notification of this order, since it varied from that of the military governor, and
< T^V 1Un f ^ dl f usse d th e> situation with Colonel Wilson and the captain of the
xi 1 x tterm ‘ Earoki what was the real reason of the order, he replied that
the town was perfectly safe, but that certain people had been saying that the Sherif
was as much m the hands of the British as the Turks were in the hands of the Germans,
and that rumours like this were causing harm. It was therefore necessarv that we
should communicate any business we had in writing. He also said that Sherif Mohsin
ad ommed soldiers to be at the landing-stage and that probably any attempt to land
W °i bn r ® slsted - Colonel Wilson said that his business could only' be done on shore,
and that the landing of the stores and batteries might be indefinitely delayed, and I
miormed haroki that unless permission was given to us to land, I should be obliged to
represent the matter to the High Commissioner. He then consented on condition that
wee id not talk any politics in the town. At his urgent request, I tore up the written
notification, which he evidently viewed in the light of a damaging piece of evidence
against himself. From the fact that (a) the first remark of Sherif Mohsin at our next
meeting was that we could come ashore freely whenever we had any business, and
(/>) that the Sherif next morning, without a moment’s hesitation, gave me permission to
Msit the British Consulate, we were all forced to the conclusion that Faroki had
H T te l eXCeeded tde Sherif’s instructions in the effort to keep us away from
Jeddah. The same opposition had been showed to Colonel Wilson by Jamil Eff. before
my arrival. The only reasons that we could think of were, firstly, that they wished to
show the people that the Sherif could give what orders he pleased to the representatives