File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎199r] (395/450)

APPENDIX (A).
Colonel Wilson’s Report on His Mission to Jeddah.
THE Grand Sherif appears to have started his revolt without sufficient preparation
and somewhat prematurely; he has entered into a struggle which is taxing his powers
to a high degree, and intrigue amongst his own people, which appeal's to be rampant,
does not tend to make matters easier for him. I do not, however, feel much doubt as
to his ultimate success, but to ensure this he must be kept well supplied with foodstuffs,
of which he is in urgent need. _ _
There appears to have been some delay in forwarding foodstuffs to the Sheriff and
one serious error as to amounts ; should any serious set-back to his forces occur ^ at
Medina, the Sheriff will more than probably try to put the blame on the British
Government, owing to supplies not being available when he expected them. The
seriousness of the consequences to the British Government should the present Hejaz
revolt fail is too patent to call for remark. _ . . ,
To facilitate matters of supply and communications between His Majesty s
Government and the Sherif, I am strongly of opinion that a senior British officer or
official who knows some Arabic and understands Arabs should be appointed, without
loss of time, to be the representative of the British Government with the Sherif,
having his residence at Jeddah. This representative should not be termed a consul,
but a special British envoy, or given some similar status, he should have full power to
deal with questions as they arise, on lines which would require defining.
While I consider that such an envoy should receive his appointment direct from
His Majesty’s Government, thereby greatly strengthening his hands, I do not propose
that he should communicate direct with the Foreign Office, but be under the immediate
orders of the high official who may be in charge of the military and political affairs of
the Sherif; these duties, in my opinion, must be run by one official, it being almost
impossible to separate the military operations from the political side. Such a division
of responsibility must, I think, lead to confusion, and it would presumably entail two
British representatives at Jeddah entirely independent of each other.
The envoy would require the following staff to begin with :
1 A member of the consular service, who could eventually fill the position of
British Consul at Jeddah, which, after the war, will, I imagine, become a
port of considerable importance.
2. A British officer or official who knows Arabic and has had previous experience
with Arabs.
3. A British doctor. .
4 A really capable and energetic Moslem doctor who has experience of the duties
of Medical Officer of Health, who could be usefully employed to organise
sanitary services, &c., at Jeddah; under existing conditions Jeddah runs a
very good chance of being visited by an epidemic of cholera, plague, typhoid,
or some such disease. . .
5 At least two really capable senior clerks and intelligence agents, such as
Hussein Effendi Rubi and Ibrahim Bey Dimitri, of the Sudan Civil Service.
Until the British Consulate at Jeddah has been overhauled and put into a sanitary
and habitable condition, the Envoy and his staff will have to live on a ship in the
harbour, and a small launch, drawing not more than 2| feet will be necessary. ^
The existing method of communication with the Sherif would appear to be
inadequate, it is certainly unsatisfactory, and unless there ps some permanent British
representative at Jeddah the present confusion of the continual re( l]Jf sts ^ >r SU PP ies ’
&c will continue. It is somewhat difficult to know at present difficult to kn-w-n't
mre^mt definitely whether a sudden request for supplies is an entirely new order or
already included in a previous demand. A representative would be able to keep a
record of and sift such demands settling any doubtful points on the spot.
There appears to be a very real fear of a shortage of foodstuffs yjust before I left
Jeddah Sheikh Mohammed-bin-Oreyfan informed me that a sheikh just arnved 10 m
Medina had said that the ration issued to the Arab forces round Medina was one sheep
for each seven men every two days, without any rice, flour, &c., and also what wou
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