File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎137r] (271/450)

secret.
k .LI 'i-
, L_±Ej6
\ DEPRECIATION OF ATTACHED ARAB RKPH^Vn
[New Seri as. )
ARAB SIIUATTON.
; U'
f;
factors: ^ pr ° S0nt situat i°n in Hejaz is influenced by two
,1^ the snowfall in the Caucasus.
1 c ? ain S of ' th ® c 03 ! weather in Northern Arabia.
The coming into p_a/ of these two factors was anticipated in
the appreciations dated 5th June, 19th June and 18th July.
" (}) vKhen the Thrks have dealt a blow at the Grand
Duke^m the_ Caucasus, they will probably despatch a
coapxe of divisions to the Hejaz aha make short work of
the Sheri?. _ Ihis would mean henceforth a Turkish nom
inee as Sherif and the final squashing of any hopes of a
weakened Turkey or of a non-Ottoman Caliphate and would
prepare the way for a real pan-Islamic rising. I am of
opinion that if a rising takes place in Hejaz, which the
enemy is given leisure to quell in Turco-Teutonic style,
the ciiddle East will become a source of greater danger
than ever it was before, and a serious drag on operations
in the West, The Lahej episode will be repeated on a
grand scale,
(2) At present it is urgent that the Sherif should
be given all possible assistance in munitions, food and
money to enable him'to make headway during the hot months
of July and August, during which time the Arabs have a
greater power of action than the Turks. As regards
military operations the Sherif f s position may become
critical in September, when the weather improves and a
release of Turkish troops in Armenia may be anticipated.
(3) Should the railway be liable to interruption
between Damascus andMa T an owing to the activities of
the Bedawin the Sherif’s position at Mecca will be fair
ly secure; but should the Turks establish easy access to
Medina, the situation to the south will be precarious.*
It was not then foreseen that the participation of
Roumania would call away a large number of troops from Turkey-
in-Asia, and the forecasts quoted are modified by this fresh
factor. However the main point which has to be taken into
consideration is that if the Turks can maintain effective
Railway communication between Medina and Damascus or even be
tween Medina and Dera’a, collect sufficient transport at
Medina, and there organise a mobile force with a fighting
head
H ■;