File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎119r] (235/450)

SECRET.
APPRECIATION OF THE ANNEXED ARABIAN REPORT No. XI {New Series).
THIS week’s report is more than usually bulky owing to several large papers
having come in simultaneously from various quarters. However, there are certain
items which require careful attention. The whole of the reports of the narratives of
the two Arab officers should be read, as they give a very good general view of Turkey
since the beginning of hostilities and a useful survey of the Arabic-speaking provinces
of the Ottoman Empire. The special points which may be gathered from the reports
of these officers are : (i) the usefulness of aeroplane pamphlet propaganda, which both
officers urge should be used freely in Syria, having given excellent results in the past;
(ii) the great prestige which the British Navy enjoys on the Mediterranean littoral, a
prestige which has not suffered in the same way as that of our land forces; (iii) the
feebleness of the Hejaz railway and its liability to interruption from purely natural
causes; (iv) the situation in Syria and Palestine, which will be referred to in a later
passage; and (v) the corroboration of the reported horrors perpetrated on the
Armenians. With regard to the Armenian evidence it is suggested that the matter
should be made public in such a form as will not expose the source of information.
With regard to the rest of the report, the outstanding question is that of the
military position at Rabegh. Admiral Wemyss’ latest report is distinctly reassuring,
and, combined with the fall of Taif and the consequent addition to the Sherif’s forces,
and the evident difficulties which the Turkish commander has to combat in coping with
transport problems, gives grounds for good hope of the Sherif’s being able to hold his
own; however, it must be remembered that the Sherif s men are still only raw levies of
irregulars, deficient in artillery and organisation.
The proposal to land British or European-led troops at Rabegh (it is submitted, j
as a personal opinion) is one fraught with grave danger both to the Sherif and to
ourselves, and should only be used as a last resort. The Arabs are fiercely independent,
and the appearance of European-led troops in large formed bodies in what is
undoubtedly Hejaz territory might provoke violent confusion and dissension amongst
them. The Sherif may have made the request for such assistance in a moment of panic,
but should the request be made again it would be well to remember that such an act
could only be justified by the certainty of its necessity and the equal certainty of its
success. In event of a "collapse of the Sherif’s power it would be wiser to offer him
safety at Jeddah than to embark on a risky campaign in forbidden lands; however, for
the moment there does not appear to be any ground for serious apprehension.
Presuming that military arrangements are being macie for action from Egypt,
the most efficacious assistance we can give the Sherif is^ to make this action as con
centrated and successful as possible; on the same hypothesis the best political assistance
that can be given to such military action is to work up the elements of rebellion in
Syria, Palestine, and the Syrian Desert, which will have the double effect of impeding
Turkish operations in Hejaz and Southern Palestine by causing confusion in the area
where the Turkish central military control is stationed.
It is suggested that from some point in tne Gulf of Akaba it should be possible to
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