File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎114r] (225/450)

SECRET.
mm **,,0
(j^
ll'
APPRECIATION OF THE ANNEXED ARABIAN REPORT No. XII
(New Series).
' ■ rf
LITTLE news of consequence comes from Hejaz, where Arab want of artillery and
Turkish lack of transport seem to produce a temporary deadlock. The Rabegh situation
remains unchanged, and is to that extent satisfactory.
The arrival of the Haj at Mecca marks one important stage in the Arabian
movement.
In a reply to a question as to what effect the collapse of the Sherif might be
expected to have on the Orient, the G.O.C. Egypt observes that though it might
provoke a formidable upheaval, it might have “as little effect as the evacuation of
Gallipoli or the surrender of Kut.” This suggests that in certain lights these two
public humiliations have had little influence, on the other hand, it is submitted that both
these events have had a repercussion far-reaching and profound. The Turks, in spite
of disaffection and exhaustion, have an enhanced prestige, while ours has declined,
consequently the moral value of very moderate enemy elements is increased, while
our troops lose in containing power, owing to the growing disbelief in our offensive
capacity.
Two ideas general in the East are :—
(i.) That a number of British Generals had to give up their swords to a young
Turkish officer.
(ii.) That the English are the only European soldiers, except the Greeks, on whom
the Turks can inflict unavenged defeat.
It is submitted that the number of men we have to employ against the Senussi, as
compared with the number of men the Turks use to contain a possible rebellion in
Syria, is a good example of what our mutual moral position is in the eyes of Orientals.
The Viceroy’s telegram in regard to Ibn Saud is in consonance with the general
policy of the Government of India in regard to the m ovement. What the
“ immense benefits” are which accrue from the passive friendship of JNejd it is ditticult
to see. Ibn Sand’s friendship implies the enmity of Ibn Reshid, the situation being
one of Coddling and Short, with both gentry equally unwilling to fight each other or
anyone else, except at a safe distance. The suggestion that if Ibn baud sent 1,0 0 i
men at our request to Hejaz, he might at some future date make embarrassing claims
on the Sherif, would appear to show a bias in favour of inaction.
The rumour of offers of bribes to Swiss journalists to undertake pro-lurk anti-
German propaganda coincides with the information conveyed to Mr Bourchier at
Constanza regarding a Talaat-Enver split and a plot against the existing regime a
C ° The purpose of both these schemes is obviously the splitting of the Anglo-Russian
1