Skip to item: of 956
Information about this record Back to top
Open in Universal viewer
Open in Mirador IIIF viewer

File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎90v] (178/450)

This item is part of

The record is made up of 1 item (245 folios). It was created in 22 Jan 1918-24 Mar 1919. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

Transcription

This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.

Apply page layout

4
Sir H McMahon added that these aeroplances were on their way to Rabegh under
instructions to the Commander-in-chief from the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. .
In a later telegram, transmitted by Sir H. McMahon on the 21 st October [No. 924],
the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. explained that he had decided not to send the aeroplanes, because their
employment at Rabegh would necessitate the presence of a large British force.
On the 18th October the Foreign Office forwarded through Sir H. McMahon
[No. 834] a communication for the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. from the C.I.G.S. to the following effect.
The War Committee had decided not to send British troops to Rabegh, and British
troops could not be sent to relieve Sudanese troops for the Sherif, who must rely on his
own resources except as regards munitions and supplies (which would be sent as far as
other calls permitted), and such assistance as the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. himself could give in the shape
of Mohammedan personnel raised and trained either in Hejaz or Sudan by such Moham
medan instructors as could be found. It was hoped before long to keep the Turks busy
on the Egyptian frontier, and there did not seem to be any immediate danger of the
Sherif collapsing now that the pilgrimage had been successfully completed. The
Government’s military policy was that France and Flanders were the chief theatres
of war, and consequently our efforts were concentrated on being strong there and on
reducing commitments elsewhere as far as possible. This policy should guide the
Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , as all other commanders in secondary theatres.
On the following day the Foreign Office telegraphed to the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. through Sir H.
McMahon [No. 836], telling him that His Majesty’s Government had decided that
neither a British nor a Sudanese brigade could be sent to Rabegh, as, apart from
military reasons, there were political objections to the sending of either British troops
or British officers; but that he had full discretion to arrange with the Commander-in-
chief, Egypt, to send guns, aeroplanes, and supplies which were really required and
could be spared, and, further, to arrange with Colonel Bremond for the despatch, when
ready, of the guns and instructors sent by the French Government.
In regard to the landing of British troops in Hejaz, an absolutely reliable agent
reports that, in talking with the Sherif’s son Ali, he explained to him our grave
reluctance to send them even to the coast; and he seemed to agree that, from the
Arab point of view, it would be a heavy blunder, save under rmperrous necessity. Ali
said that three batteries of quick-firing guns would suffice them—one for defence and
two for a possible advance against Medina.
On the 19th October the Arab Bureau telegraphed to H.M.I. [A.B. 34 ] that
Captain Lawrence (at Jeddah) had reported that nobody knew the real situation at
Raoegh, to which place he and Aziz were going on the following day. Abdulla
apparently wanted a foreign force there in case the Arab attack on Medina should end
badly. Azrz, however, hoped to prevent any decisive risk, and thought that a British
brigade was not necessary and would not be prudent ; the only way, in his opinion, to
bring continuity and sense into the operations was to have a British staff' at Rabegh
dealing directly with Faisal and All, without reference of details to the Sherif, of whom
t e} \\ eie all afraid. The withdrawal of British aeroplanes was unfortunatelv simul
taneous with the appearance of Turkish machines, but Aziz himself attached but little
weight io them. Aziz speaks well of the Sherif’s troops and is cheerful
On the 21st October the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. telegraphed to C.I.G.S., saying that he had
recalled the flight of aeroplanes directly, in consequence of the decision not to send
n 18 . ces ^ fffibegh. lor future guidance, he asked to be informed as to whether
the necessity of the presence of a strong British force at Rabegh was known to the
War Committee at their meeting on the 17th October, at which the despatch of
aeroplanes was finally considered and sanctioned.
He asked to be informed, to prevent any conflict of opinion in the future, whether, apart
from military considerations, the present aircraft personnel (English or French and certain
selected officers excepted) with foreign contingents participating in operations in Hejaz,
but not entering reserved or sacred areas, was or was not objectionable on political grounds.
wo attenes, he said, were included in the French contingent, and they might
supply the present urgent need of Arabs for artillery, and so make it unnecessary to
ask for a battery of mountain guns from Egypt, which could be ill spared.
io this C.L.G.S. replied on the 23rd October, saying that the War Committee’s
mien ion was to eep the number of Christians landed in Hejaz as low as possible, for
winch reason it would be advisable that the escort sent with the Aeroplanes (should
u 6 U t 6 ^ ^ Mohammedan. Aircraft technical personnel might be European,
but this should be kept at the minimum necessary for efficiency; any Europeans with
le oreign con urgent^ should only be sent to Hejaz if their services should be required
oi some specific technical work which Mohammedans could not do.

About this item

Content

This item contains papers relating to British military and intelligence operations in the Hejaz and broader Arabian Peninsula during the First World War. Notably, the item contains reports by my Sir Mark Sykes relating broadly to the Anglo-French absorption of the Arab Provinces of the Ottoman Empire after the War.

Extent and format
1 item (245 folios)
Written in
English in Latin script
View the complete information for this record

Use and share this item

Share this item
Cite this item in your research

File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎90v] (178/450), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/586/2, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100057234919.0x0000bc> [accessed 16 January 2025]

Link to this item
Embed this item

Copy and paste the code below into your web page where you would like to embed the image.

<meta charset="utf-8"><a href="https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100057234919.0x0000bc">File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [&lrm;90v] (178/450)</a>
<a href="https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100057234919.0x0000bc">
	<img src="https://iiif.qdl.qa/iiif/images/81055/vdc_100000000419.0x0001e1/IOR_L_PS_10_586_0189.jp2/full/!280,240/0/default.jpg" alt="" />
</a>
IIIF details

This record has a IIIF manifest available as follows. If you have a compatible viewer you can drag the icon to load it.https://www.qdl.qa/en/iiif/81055/vdc_100000000419.0x0001e1/manifestOpen in Universal viewerOpen in Mirador viewerMore options for embedding images

Use and reuse
Download this image