File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎71v] (140/450)

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t I would estimate their weak points and their immediate needs as follows : First’
I they want guiding as to their plans, and they should be given a clear and definite role*
At present they appear to me too haphazard, and since the situation is now as important
to us as to them, we might endeavour to control them more, and we have every right to
do so.
Secondly, they require light artillery both to give them striking power and monf*
support ; the latter point is one of great importance.
Thirdly, they require men who understand machine guns.
Lastly, for division purposes they should have a cipable officer with them who can
give us reliable and useful information on improved system of c immunication.
Aeroplanes for observation purposes, offensive power, and moral support.
The best way to upset the Turkish plans is to give the Arab forces liberty of
action and offensive power. If the railway is seriously cut and kept cut, the Turks
will be very chary of sending their force towards Mecca By seriously threatening
Medina by means of the concentration of all the Arab forces they will pin the Turks to
their base.
To sum up, therefore, the situation is as follows :—The Turks are apparently
preparing to mike a descent on Mecca; their difficulties are very great, the risks
enormous. They rely on moral effect and drastic action to crush the revolt.
The Arabs have really cleared the country from Medina to Mecca ; they have no
definite, well-thought-out plan of action. Being of volatile natures, a sudden disaster
as the capture of Mecca by the Turks would, unless we supported them in another
direction, have a most disastrous effect.
Babegh is the key to the situation. Given a firm hold there, we can deny the
Sultani road to the Turks’ advance. If they should reach Mecca by an inland road it
affords a new base to the Arabs on which they can rally. From here midway between
the two cities Ahey can threaten the communications of the Turks, who will run
grave risks of their division sharing the fate of their other forces. We can support
the Arabs in this the worst contingency, and keep up their spirits and hopes, and the
situation is net lost. It affords an outward and visible sign of our support. For
offensive purposes it is highly important, affording an advance base, leaves the Arab
forces free to concentrate on Medina in their maximum strength, which is the best
means of frustrating the Turkish plan. 'the Arab leaders should, however, be
counselled not to fight a general action with ti.e Turks, which would be playing into
their hands.
As regards The landing of Europeans at Babegh, I do not think there would be
any grave objection, especially if our reasons were fully explained, and it the Arabs
really thought they were in grave danger they would ask for any troops we could
possibly spare. We have, ourselves, rather stimulated the objections to such action.
The Syrian officers are jealous of our control. We should take firmer measures and
insist on our line of action.
Finally, I am convinced the Arab leaders are earnest in their endeavours and
sincere in their friendship to ourselves.
(Signed) Norman N. E Bray, Captain.
Report by Captain Lawrence, of Intelligence Staff, Cairo.
[Sent by G.O.C -in-G, Egypt, to D.M.I., md dated November 17, 1916 (LA. 2629).]
As the towns in Hejaz are an agglomeration of foreign settlers they do not
support (he Sherd’s movement, since the Hejaz revolt is supremely Arab. All the
forces fighting for the Sherit are made up of tribesmen, and it is the tribal army 3,000
to 4,000 strong, under Sidi Faisal, in the Yenbo-Kheif-Bir Ibn Hassani Massif of
tribes that has held up the advance on. Mecca or Babegh of Faktelegri Pasha’s army
fbi five months. Babegh is not and never has been defensible with' Arab forces, and
the Turks have not got there because these hill tribes under Faisal bar their way. If
the hill tribes yield the Turks need not look for any further opposition to their advance
until neai Mecca itself. 1 his situation aiiects our consideration of the scheme to land
an Allied force at Babegh ; so long as the tribes hold out such a force is not necessary.
If the tribes give way the Turks will reach Babegh in about four days. This does not
give time foi the collection, embarkation, transport, disembarkation, and preparation of
a position for a British force to hold the front of 6,000 yards of the pMm grove at
Babegh. The British force therefore must arrive at Babegh while the tribes "are still
resisting the lurks if it is to get there in time. At present the tribes, opinion is