File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎64v] (126/450)

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to abstain in future from all intrusion within your limits and among your tribes. , You
wrote that you would communicate again with me when you received his reply.
Lastly, I have your letter of the 3rd September in which you explained that you
"would like to be informed whether the question oi co-operation with the Sherif, or of
attacking Ibn Rashid, was considered by us to be merely a matter of the internal politics
ot the Arab Chiefs, or whether they were questions in which the interests of the British
Government were also involved.
I have thought it convenient thus to summarise your Excellency’s letters, so that
your enquiries could be more clearly answered.
On receipt ol your communications, I referred to my Government as you desired
me, and oecause it was not possible for me to give you the authority to answer without
doing so, there lias been as a result some delny in the communication of this reply to
your Excellency. The result of my reference is this : —
As regards the Sherii’s intentions, His Majesty’s Government, according to the
information and knowledge which they possess, have no reason whatever to think that
he has any evil intention against your tribes or your territories. On the contrary,
his Excellency regards your Excellency as his triend and coadjutor ; and as for ourselves
vis-d-vis yourself and the Sherif, have we not our treaty with you, in article 1 of which
we have recognised you as independent ruler of your territories of Nejd ?
Of course, the Sherif must naturally recognise this treaty also, and His Majesty’s
Government would by no means support him in any other attitude towards you.
As to the question of co-operation with the Sherif, or abstention from co-operation,
and your enquiry as to whether this is a matter of the politics of the Arabs, or whether
the interests of the British Government are also involved, I will try to make the position
clear to you.
It is not hidden from you that in the first instance, Great Britain had no wish
to go to war with Turkey; but it became necessary simply because Turkey fell under
the control of Germany, who thrust her into hostilities with us.
But when by decree of fate a state of war arose, the British Government said to
themselves : “ Now that the Turks have gratuitously plunged into war with us, we will
have no more of them, and we will do our best to expel them from Iraq and Arabia,
so that in future we_ may be immune from the results of their intrigues and
maLdministration and m order that the rulers and the tubes of the Arabs may gain
freedom from such a tyrannical Government, and achieve a prosperous future.”
You will see, therefore, that it is the object and interest of the British Government
to expel the Tuiks from Arabia. A'ou will agree also that it is to the vital interest of
your Excellency, and of the Sherif, and of the other great leaders of the Arab
countries and tribes, to expiel the l urks. ! hus the object of the British Government
and the object of the Chiefs of the Arab States are one and the same ; and it is
therefore in the interest of us all that there should be co-operation between all, so that
the common object may be realised. It is for these reasons that the British Government
greatly desire the success of the Sherif. and regard it as highly desirable and most
important that you should co-operate with him to the utmost ot your power.
It is not hidden »rom you that your name carries a great prestige among the
Arabs, and, according to my information, many of the Shaykhs are only waiting to see
what your attirude is before deciding upon their own. If they hear that Ibn Sa’ud is
openly suppoiting and helping the Sherd, they will quickly take up arms in his behalf-
but if, on the other hand, they hear that Ibn Sa’ud is standing aloof, they also will
stand aloof. You w ill see, therefore, how important it is that you should make it clear
to the Arab public that you, the Ruler of Nejd, are in sympathy with the Sherif and
are assisting him to expel the Turks from Arabia.
As to how you can best do that, whether by helping him with money and men or
bv attacking Ibn Rashid, or by winning the latter over to your side, this is a question
which you can best decide for yourself. His Majesty’s Government do not wish to
press you to do this or to do that; all they wish you to understand is that your open
support, whether it be moral or active, will be of great advantage to the Sherifs cause
ana to the common object. You know best how you can most profitably assist the
feherif without serious prejudice to important interests of your own.
In short, I am sure you will realise from the above that it is of the highest
importance that not only the British Government, but all the Chiefs of Arabs like
yourself, whose present and future interests demand expulsion of the Turks from Arabia
should at this time concentrate their resources and energies on the achievement of tha^
common object. Compared with that great object, all other objects and interests
become for the present insignificant, and need to be deferred until the main object is