File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎36v] (70/450)

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detachments in Hejaz will then be concentrated. W^hen this is^done, and when Alls
force has gone, the garrison of Habegh will consist of about 900 ligyptian infantry and
gunners, and possibly 700 Arab irregulars, there was no news of Abdullas force.
The Arab Bureau telegraphed [A.B. 404] on the 13th December that there was no^
indication that the Turks were preparing to advance on Rabegh, and that the Navy hack
reported that Yambo was able to withstand an attack. There had been no news of
Abdulla since the 8 th December, when it was reported at Mecca that he was making for
the Hanakiyah, north-east of Medina, to intercept convoys of supplies coming from
central Arabia.
On the 14th December the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. telegraphed [No. 81] that it had been reported
by an aerial reconnaissance from Rabegh, on the 11 th December, that there were
twenty to thirty [group undecipherable] at Adhab and five at Ghayer, but between
Adhab and Rabegh all was clear, except for some small Bedawin encampments. He
added that Colonel Bremond and Captain Lloyd had just arrived.
Having discussed the situation with these two officers, he sent on the same day
[No. 83] along telegram, of which what follows is the gist: ( 1 ) The efforts made to train
and organise an Arab force had been unsuccessful, mainly owing to the ignorance and
inertness of the Arab leaders; ( 2 ) from a purely military point of view there appeared
to be no serious obstacle to a Turkish force penetrating to Mecca; (3) the moral effect
in a crisis of landing regular troops in Hejaz would be very great, as it would give the
Arab forces a rallying point and stimulate them to action against detached bodies and
communications; (4) he could see no other way of assisting the Arabs and saving the
movement from collapse; (5) though the Sherif had cancelled his application for
European troops, he was genuinely alarmed, and, in Colonel Bremond’s opinion, with a
little pressure would ask for them again; ( 6 ) the immediate question for His Majesty’s
Government was whether a last attempt should be made to save the Sherif and his
Arabs in spite of themselves; in his own opinion, the troops should be sent at once,
and as he agreed with Colonel Bremond that the force suggested should be increased
by two battalions of infantry, he begged that the French Government might be asked
to send to Rabegh either the two Senegalese battalions who were at Jibuti or some
similar force.
In reply to this the Foreign Office telegraphed [No. 45], on the 15th December,
that the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. had the authority of His Majesty’s Government to send a British
brigade and the French contingent, if he was satisfied as to the conditions maintained
in earlier telegrams, and if transport could be arranged. He was also authorised to
inform the Sherif that the Sinai offensive would take place almost immediately, and
that this should render material assistance to him, especially if he could induce the
Arab tribes in southern Palestine to rise against the Turks. At the same time, the
telegram said that it was fully realised that, should the Sherif s movement collapse,
the responsibility would rest with him owing to his refusal of assistance for which he
had asked and which we were prepared to send.
On receipt of this the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. telegraphed [No. 86 ] on the 16th December that he
had received from the Sherif further messages, asking that European troops should
not be sent to Rabegh, but detained at Port Sudan or Suez. The Sherif had expressed
to Colonel Wilson grave apprehensions of the effect of the landing of Christian troops
on the attitude of the Arabs and on his own prestige. He asked that two Moslem
battalions might be sent to Rabegh, and urged the desirability of a British landing at
Akaba as an alternative to Rabegh. It was not likely that he would consent to the
landing of Christian troops at Rabegh before the crisis actually arose, when it would be
too late. Unless the proposals made in his telegram No. 83 should be approved,
the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. proposed to inform the Sherif that troops and transports could not be
detained immobile, and that he must decide whether he wished a European force
to be landed at Rabegh in the course of the next fortnight; should he decide in the
negative, he must understand that his refusal would be regarded as final. The Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division.
concluded by saying that, though it seemed to him to be very small, there was always
the chance that nervousness regarding their communications, coupled with the lack of
initiative, might deter the Turks from undertaking an offensive in sufficient force to
overwhelm the Arab lines.
. 15th December the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. telegraphed [No. 84] that a seaplane recon
naissance on the 11 th December had located a Turkish force at Nakhl Mubarak in a
position to watch the approaches to Yambo ; its strength was not stated. Faisal had
repotted to the Sherif that the Turks intended to attack Yambo with an overwhelming
foice , his position was critical, and he begged that British assistance might be sent to
him “ within two days.” 5