Coll 6/4(1) 'Asir: Assumption by Ibn Saud of control of internal administration of Asir.' [‎181v] (369/1104)

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about September last, having either completely failed to make headway earlier
in the year or having been forestalled and thrown out of gear by the untimely
opening of the Ibn Rifada show. I lean to the former view, supposing that had
they made any headway they might well have expedited then pi ogramme during
the two months for which Ibn Rifada lasted, but that internal conditions in Asir
were not sufficiently favourable then. However that may be it is clear from the
various sources of information that the Dabbagh branch of the Hejazi Liberal
»arty has had a considerable hand in the present revolt. It may have been the^
prime mover, but it is more likely only to have supplied opportune assistants who
were in a position to introduce a certain directive force, a few aims and a little
money (though it is said that Asir has no need of arms), the promise of much
more and encouragement to look for moral support and perhaps future freedom
from the Amir Abdullah ; whether or not his name was taken in vain there is no
present means of judging. But it is to be noted that the Imam Yahya has, so
far. either had nothing to do with this revolt or has hidden his tracks very
cleverly. I suspect, the latter. , „ • .
5.' Turning to the attached papers, which are chiefly interesting for the
light they throw on Saudi methods and mentality, one finds that in the
“ Introduction, pp. 1 and 2, the writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. (who may be Sheikh ^ ussuf \asin) is at
pains to convince that any revolt against Ibn Sand is a revolt against Islam and
the Arabs, but he was premature in stating that the Idrisi had already come to
his due end of “destruction apd annihilation.” In the ‘Beginning of the
Affair,” pp. 3 and 4, he stresses ad nauseam Ibn Sand’s magnificent patience,
which might, however, from the evidence here given, be more properly qualified
as criminal negligence, a point to which I will recur later. Passing over for the
purposes of this despatch the writer’s account of the “ Conspirators’ Objects and
Plan,” pp. 4 to 6 . we find at the bottom of p. 6 what was apparently the Saudi
Governor’s first note of warning of trouble in Asir in a telegram to Ibn Saud
dated the 26th September. He makes here the only unfriendly reference to the
Imam Yahya which is made throughout the exchanges of telegrams which now
follow, reporting that he was said to be mobilising troops to send either against
Jizan or the Beni Hasan (one of his own tribes). (But the Imam seems to have
been always mobilising troops these past three years; to have kept people
guessing.) The Governor is also suspicious of a change of heart in the Idrisi.
“since before the Ibn Rifada rebellion,” but this last may be an editorial
interpellation; the whole series of telegrams shows, to my mind, signs of having
been heavily edited for publicity. Ibn Baud’s reply of the 29th September, for
instance, on p. 7, is much too good to be true. Down to “ so I ask you to be kind
and gentle to the Idrisi ” was almost certainly written ex post facto, but the final
“ If he has evil intention, God will cause him to be defeated, while if what is
said is false, it is in the nature of most rumour ” rings true.
6 . For a month after this exchange of warning and precept there seems to
have been no further cause for alarm, so far as can be judged from the one-sided
evidence here given, but on the 27th October began a rapid exchange of telegrams
pp. 8 to 13, comprising increasingly serious reports from Saudi officials at Jizan,
which end on the 5th November with the words “ we have enough water for some
days and upon God we rely,” when they were besieged, and uniformly placid
replies from Ibn Saud, of which that of the 1st November is typical; “ Accept
the Idrisi s apologies and show him the greatest respect. Facts must become
known. Be very careful to show him respect and regard.” (On the 6 th Jizan
capitulated to the Idrisi). It is difficult to understand Ibn Sand’s attitude,
unless it was due to extreme caution bred of fear that any warlike preparation
on his part might bring the Imam openly into the field against him. His
telegi ams as published show him to have been pacifist to a degree which allowed
the initial stages of revolt to develop unchecked. If they are apocryphal, as
seems probable, the fact remains that he appears to have taken no action to
forestall the trouble so clearly foreseen and reported by his officials. Fie had ven
few troops in Asir, it is true. About the 25th October his armoured car detach
ment, which had been stationed in Asir since the Jabal Arwa trouble of last year,
had actually returned to Mecca. If as much attention was not paid as
prominence has been given to conspiratorial activities in Asir, Ibn Saud must bo
accounted either as a very negligent commander or as fearful of rousing the
Imam or as inviting revolt for ulterior purposes of his own.