Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎291r] (581/644)

provinces had been virtually detached the independence and integrity of Persia
would be past praying for. Despite the categorical nature of the lehran
Declaration concerning Persia, it is not too much to say that, in the light of all
the local Russian activities during the year under review, the disintegration of
Persia as a national entity appeared to be the Kremlin’s long-term objective. Nor
it possible, for anyone acquainted with the Soviet system and Soviet practice,
comfort himself with the theory of a local policy insufficiently controlled by
Moscow.
7. From the point of view of the conduct of the war, the close of the year
saw one very important development: with the opening of the Black Sea route,
Persia would shortly cease to be a channel for the supply to Russia of any
appreciable quantities of Allied war material- except aviation spirit. Even
aviation spirit would possibly cease to be sent to Russia across Persia after
June 1945, and the main justification for the presence in Persia of Allied troops
in areas other than tihose contiguous with the southern oilfields would thereby be
removed. But His Majesty’s Government considered that British troops could
only be withdrawn pari passu with the withdrawal of the Russian forces; and
although the presence of these forces was probably not essential to the realisation
of the Russian political objective referred to above—for which, indeed, a “ Baltic
States ” technique of mock plebiscites and “ spontaneous " popular appeals was
far better suited—there seemed on the face of it very little prospect of inducing
the Russians to evacuate promptly any part of the rich areas of Persia which
they had made so nearly their own.
8. Throughout the' year the weight of Russian pressure was such that
Anglo-Persian relations were largely conditioned by it. There was no cause of
direct friction of the slightest importance. Barring one or two minor incidents,
the comparatively few British troops in the country behaved admirably. British
military intervention in Persian affairs was as unobtrusive as the protection of
our vital interests allowed, and was indeed scarcely perceptible outside the
oilfields area, except in regard to the internment of undesirables. His Majesty’s
Embassy, it is true, lent their full moral support to the unpopular Millspaugh
Mission, though towards the end Dr. Millspaugh’s indiscretions made it
impossible to continue to support him personally; but the disinterested character
of their motives for doing so should be self-evident. Active pro-German
pympathies automatically waned as the tide of war turned more and more
strongly in our favour. British officers, seconded for service under the Persian
administration, played a useful part in grain collection and the organisation of
transport. The local personnel of the Middle East Supply Centre—mainly
British during the greater part of the year—were manifestly out to afford the
maximum of help to Persia within the limits imposed by world shortages and
shipping difficulties.
9. It might be supposed that, since in all these and many other ways we
compared so favourably with the Russians, there would have been a marked
swing of Persian sentiment towards us. That this was not at all obviously the
case is due to the fact that cowardice, moral and physical, is an outstanding trait
of the Persian character. Probably most Persians realised in their heart of
hearts how favourable the comparison was to us; but very few were prepared to
displease the Russians by shaping their words and actions accordingly. Vanity,
moreover, is next only to cowardice in the Persian make-up, and the national
habit is consequently "to ascribe all the country’s shortcomings and misfortunes
to foreign interference. Criticism of the Russians being too dangerous, the
British had to serve as scapegoats; and a large proportion of the Persian press
was highly critical of British policy. This was true not only of the newspapers
known to be controlled or subsidised by the Russians, but also of a good many
others. In the matter of the Persian internees, for example, there was much
agitation against the actions of the British, while the equal responsibility of
the Russians was scarcely ever mentioned. In tribal matters it was the same
story : the Persian military were free to conduct operations against the southern
tribes without let or hindrance from us, whereas, as stated above, they were not
allowed by the Russians to deal with unruly Kurds in the north; yet the press
freely accused the “ British imperialists ” of the most sinister machinations in
the south, and carefully abstained from all criticism of the Soviet attitude. It
is true that the Persian press (which boasts upwards of seventy papers in Tehran
v alone) exists largely on blackmail and is not genuinely representative of Persian
public opinion. Since, however, it is almost the sole purveyor of information to
the public, its influence is by no means negligible; and it w T ould be a mistake to
dismiss as unimportant for the future the fact that, during all the year under
[64—52] b 2