Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎3r] (5/644)

[8706] b 2
I.—Introduction.
BOTH internally and internationally 1932 has been a wretched year for
Persia as for other countries, the south being especially afflicted by a drought
which over a large area round Bushire entirely destroyed the spring crop and
iiecessitated the importation of drinking water, as well as of corn, and then by
unprecedented rainfall which caused widespread havoc in the Kerman district.
The Lurs, already desperate as the result of the Government’s methods of
££ settling ” them, have been out for trouble and appear to be making quite a fair
living by looting lorries, principally on the Dizful-Khorremabad road. No really
successful engagement with them has been reported. At the same time the
Government can take comfort from the fact that there are no signs of concerted
action among the southern tribes. In other parts of the country there have been
no sensational developments, just a steady advance towards absolute poverty
punctuated by increased taxation, by the National Bank scandal, by the arrival of
the Persian ££ fleet,” by a considerable order for British military aircraft, by plans
for the acquisition of artillery, armoured cars and tanks and for the rapid
completion of the railway programme, by talk of raising the army to 100,000
men, and by the strange and disquieting methods employed by the Shah to add
field to field to the Imperial properties in North Persia.
2. Externally, the only solid achievement was the settlement of the long
standing frontier dispute with Turkey. Other events were : The ratification of
the commercial treaty with Soviet Russia, which has done nothing to prevent a
steady deterioration in the commercial as well as political relations between the
two countries; the State visit of King Feisal, which was not marred by any
untoward incident; the resumption of Anglo-Persian negotiations, which made
some slight progress in matters of secondary importance, but were not materially
assisted, as they should have been, by the transfer of the Imperial Airways route
to the Arab coast, and which, after being nearly brought to an abrupt end by a
sudden demand by the Persian Government for the evacuation of Hen jam, were
left in a state of suspended animation when, on the 27th November, the Minister
of Finance formally announced to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company the can
cellation of the D'Arcy Concession; and, in the last days of the year, the fall of
Teymourtache.
3. The facts regarding these events are related in full detail, in so far as
they are known, in the body of the report. It seems appropriate here to discuss
the failure of Teymourtache to bring our general treaty negotiations to a
conclusion, the Shah’s decision to cancel the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
concession, as the two matters principally affecting British interests, and the
dismissal of Teymourtache as an event of outstanding importance and
significance.
4. When Teymourtache’s absence in Europe at the beginning of the year
became unexpectedly prolonged, Tehran gossips were heard to say that he had
exhausted his credit with the Shah and was afraid to return. There was, as
subsequent events gradually revealed, probably some truth in this gossip : the
administration of the country had for so long been a ££ two man show,” that it
seems possible that the Shah was surprised and pleased to find that the machine
continued to work without Teymourtache in close attendance. Teymourtache
certainly did not appear at the time of his return in January to have any suspicion
that “the King’s countenance was changed towards him,” and he undoubtedly
believed that in his negotiations with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company he had
done an excellent bit of work for his Sovereign (which was true enough). More
over, when he left London he certainly seemed convinced that the time was ripe,
the commercial treaty with the Soviet Government having been concluded, to reach
a political settlement with His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
and the Government of India.
5. Looking back on these negotiations, there does not seem to be any moment
at which Teymourtache definitely decided that he could not obtain a satisfactory
treaty. There is no doubt that from the very beginning of the negotiations five
years ago he firmly believed, as a strong nationalist, that Persia was entitled to
receive more than His Majesty’s Government were willing to give, but if the
negotiations had proceeded more rapidly and he had thus reached the conclusion