'File 8/62 Muscat State Affairs: Principal Shaikhs and Tribes of Oman' [‎44r] (87/296)

province of Dhofar. Hhen he first visited Dhofar shortly after his
accession, disorder was rife and this authority of his Government did
not extend much beyond the coastal strip between Raisut and Merbat.
Now his effective influence covers the entire inhabited coastal and
hill areas from Ras Shuwamiyah to the borders of the Aden Protecto
rate. The Shaikhs of the Qara and Kathir recognise Ms authority
and are regular visitors to his palace when he. is there, and to his
Wall in his absence.
7. I do not imagine that, the Sultan's idea of British Forces es
tablishing him as de facto Ruler of Oman (and probably having tomain-
tafn him in that position) is one that would commend itself to either
His Majesty's Government or to the Government of India - unless stra
tegic considerations of the future are considered as requiring further
e:camination of the proposal for a protectorate first raa.de in 1890.
Assuming that no such radical change in our attitude of non-interference
with the interior can be contemplated, it would, I suggest, be unwise
for us to associate ourselves directly with the Sultan's aims and
thereby incur responsibilities which we are not prepared to carry
out to the full. Our general policy should, I submit, continue to be
one of strengthening the authority of the Sultan while making it clear
that the extension of his influence must be at his responsibility and
achieved by his own exertions. My own view is that the attitude of
the Ghafiri Shaikh is one more example of the Arab’s eye being "fixed
unflinklngly in the main change". The healthy condition of the State
Treasury is already beginning to exert a strong centripetal force,
against which the Imam lias no effective counter measure, and given the
necessary materials to discourage Hinawi opposition, the Sultan would
probably have little difficulty in re-establishing himself. By action
on his own initiative and without direct support from outside, he would
not only enhance his own reputation amongst the tribes, but would also
be forced to base his actions on the more stable foundation of consent.
8. In persuance of this policy I would suggest that the Sultai^ be
given facilities for acquiring additional arms and equipment in reason
able quantities. At the end of the war large stocks of surplus mili
tary stores will presumably become available and it might then be pos
sible tc make a presentation to him of a number of small field guns
with ammunition and perhaps mortars. This suggestion will form the
subject of a separate reference linked to the facilities he has given
to us during the war.
9. In any developments towards Oman, the position of the British
Adviser, if one is appointed, would I think remain unaffected as he
would presumably occupy himself principally with relations with the
Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. and the administrative affairs of the coastal area. So far as
the Levies are concerned, it seems desirable that when our war time res
ponsibilities for internal security end, the State should be encouraged
to depend less on our assistance is the administration and command of
Its military force. In bis half-brother, Saiyid Tariq, the Sultan
has a man who has just returned from extensive training with the Zhob
Militia and the Chagai Levy Corps and whose services could probably be
most suitably utilised in this sphere.
10. It is relevant to observe in conclusion that if the advice
tendered to the Sultan is unfavourable to his aims, he is likely to be
come a despondent and disinterested Ruler and to retire finally to Dho
far - with unfortunate, if not serious, consequence to the State.
11. I shall he glad to receive your instructions in due course.
|e
Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Muscat