File 2764/1904 Pt 4 'Baghdad Railway: Anglo-Turkish negotiations; proposals of Turkish Govt; status of Kowait' [‎177r] (358/674)

SIR EDWARD GREY : We need not be very keen about getting much inland.
. YISCOUNT KITCHENER : Has it ever been considered that the irrigation works
which are taking place here will interfere with the navigation ? Does Admiral Slade’s
Report on the Shat-al-Arab deal with that ?
SIR EDWARD GREY : Would the irrigation works affect the navigation below
Basra ?
* + ™ U Nr KIICHENER : I have been asking whether that had been examined
into; I do not know whether they would or would not. I doubt whether it would
^ ^ ver y much. I was. only asking whether it has ever been examined into by
Wiicocks, or whether any opinion has been got from him.
SIR ARTHUR WILSON : There was a report from Wiicocks only a few days
ago, but I do not think he can have known very much about it.
■
. . EDWARD GREF : We have always acted on the assumption that the
irrigation would not affect the navigation below Basra, but that it would very much
afreet it between Basra and Baghdad.
VISCOUNT KITCHENER: I should think it is a question that Wiicocks might
give us an important opinion upon.
. VISCOUNT MORLEY : Lord Curzon, to go back to your point about the
desirableness of keeping the whole of that region with all the ensigns of sovereignty and
so on, how does that affect it ?
LORD CURZON : My point was always this—that Turkish sovereignty along the
Shat-al-Arab and down there is of course rather precarious, and is constantly disputed
by the Arab tribes; but, at the same time, we have never contested that it was Turkish
territory, and I thought myself that no possible harm can result to us, and that advantage
may accrue to the Turkish Government, from our recognition of that fact. I would
recognise Turkish sovereignty over the whole of the territory there if the recognition
was required, right away down to the disputed territory of Koweit.
VISCOUNT MORLEY : You have stated that, feeling that it is more essential
for our interests that there should be a decently strong Turkish Government in those
regions ?
O
LORD CURZON : Yes.
SIR EDWARD GREY: But you do not want the Turks to be in such a position
that they could block the navigation of the Shat-al-Arab, so as to shut off all communi
cation at Mohammerah (Muhamrah).
LORD CURZON : I want them to be stopped at Basra, and I have always
wanted that.
* SIR EDWARD GREY : You said the control of the Shat-al-Arab was within their
sovereignty
LORD CURZON : I did not say the Shat-al-Arab, but the control of the river
down to Basra. The Shat-al-Arab is Persian on the left bank. For every reason
I think it is most important to end the railway at Basra, and not to bring it down
further. Once you bring it south of Basra, you have an enormous sphere of complicated
interests arising. If you bring it down the Shat-al-Arab you will have the Sheikh of
Mohammerah (Muhamrah), and if you take it down to Koweit you will have all these
questions about the disputed claims. You will have all the difficulties arising of
making your harbour at Koweit, and you will have an international question arising :
What is to be the status of this man ? What about the Customs ? Who is to manage
the port ? Then you will have the fact, which I have always attached great importance
to, that you will have a port in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. as the terminus of a railway which is
not a British railway, but which is under the influence of a foreign Power if not
under foreign sovereignty. The longer you keep that off the better. If you can
have your terminus at Basra, if I may be allowed to give an opinion, I should