Coll 17/4 'Iraq-Syria & Syria-Transjordan frontier: delimitation' [‎24r] (52/788)

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It i/a trapezoidal wedg^ abfu^forty Mio'metres h w eCl and T "('‘“vf’ 1 the “ BeC de Canard ”•
d—d
of defence towards the north. Y t0 the south - caimot institute an effective position
conflict between Iraq andTyna'^s^pmran^tSTa 3 '"' 1 ^^ 8 f’* the eventuali fy of a
certainly not be directed against such m outlying reKion^fthe^Sr^ 0 ’?- the a^^u' H would
more vital parts of Syria. A movement carried out in the redon nfth^T '""ii, ' against
be aimed not at Syria but at Iran Foi mirh nT1 - e ,? 10n the { l g ris > therefore, would
doubt be Mardin-Diarbekir-Bitlis^nd its first main oW+W he ^ ° f con l cei } tration would no
of the serious obstacle provided on the left bank nf ti,J - e k 0 ^ c f r }' ai 1 n ^y Mosul. In view
be anticipated that the attack would take place chieflv orfth ^ S e ^ e ^ el ran S e - ^ ma y
the road and railway track from Msibin to^Mosu? 1 Would Svn^ ° f f 6 ^^ alon g
to resist such an attempt to cross thT‘‘^ and would she be able,
lack of outlets and th^ distance ofthfare^m theLmtary°cemr^“fT ? ^
mg^on er,eXert ^ the r6ar ° f SUch an a ^tack from the Hass^heh
In case of an evacuation of the “Bee de Canard ” by Syria, Iraq would therefore find herself
alone m face of the aggressor Her defence would no doubt be facilitated by the powerful flank
position constituted by the Jebel Smjar. F
5. Political and Administrative Considerations.
The Ottoman Empire was divided, from the administrative point of view, into vilayets,
sandjaks, etc. In the sparsely-populated and arid zone with which we are dealing, the desert
constitutes a natural division, bor this reason, the central administration, which was generally
ignorant of the details of local conditions, had drawn a few rough lines on the map to mark the
administrative boundaries across the desert. The nomad, however, who was the only inhabitant
of these vast regions, was ignorant of the existence both of the administration and of the boundaries
fixed by it. For centuries, since before the Hegira, he had but one law, that of the desert, and he
never acknowledged any other. He had his social organisation, his policy of mutual assistance
and alliances, and his mode of living, which nothing could change. The imperial authority had
implicitly recognised itself to be incapable of exercising more than nominal dominion over this
immense area.
The Kurds, Turcomans and Circassians on the one hand and the Arabs on the other were,
in practice, masters of their own existence. They were free to take their herds where they could
find pasture, to attack ill-defended caravans, or to plunder a weaker tribe that refused to pay
tribute.
When, last century, the Sultans wished to enforce the collection of taxes in the desert and in
Northern Mesopotamia, they established a network of police posts capable at least of protecting
the lines of communication between the important centres. This system having given poor results,
it was endeavoured to make the chiefs of the tribes themselves responsible for the supervision.
But experience showed that, as long as the nature of the inhabitants was not changed by a new
mode of living, any attempt to establish security and order m the desert was foredoomed to failure.
Hence the nomads were encouraged to settle in the region of the Hgns Mong the Kabur an^
on the banks of the Euphrates. A school was even founded at Const^tmople to endeavo
though without much success — to exercise a softening influence on e
children of the Bedouin chiefs. . . ,
Nevertheless, as a result of this policy of settlement, a certain numher of villages were founded
But for lack of effective protection they were obliged to have ^
true masters of the desert. Victims in turn of the enemies 0 . j-j we encountered
themselves, these villages were soon destroyed, and the numerous rums which we encount
on our journey still bear witness to those melanc 0 y imes. entrusted to the
It was not until the application of th ® h S5 [ S Xpursued by the Ottoman Empire
European Powers by the League of Natiom t c sacrifices. Thanks to the strictest
began to be gradually realised, although at the _ & established in these regions, and even
armed supervision, some measure of security was ^d^ ^ f settli the
in the midst of the desert, thus facilitating ^ it y will be possible
nomads. The success of this policy depen s, > ,, v no t be deprived of the fruits
to give to the populations attracted d tages [ n settling on the soil before he decides
- stars Fszx&szssstSi & •• - -»—
*“lh, p„« uncertainty rcyrd,., the —
of which is so unfavourable. c • w i n DO ssession of this sector for only two years,
If it is further considered that Syria fi 6 " P r d safeguard her military positions.
it is natural that she should first of aU . da y, e " d b f™ it he r to devote herself to the economic
But the final settlement of ^T^ourtTVetstablfshment of lines of communication and of a
development of this part of the country, ine estao