'Persia and the Persian Question by the Hon. George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P.' [‎624] (693/714)

624
PERSIA
decade. No attempt is made to argue that Russia has extorted
this privilege as a guarantee for a fair, or even a preferential con
sideration of her own interests, when the question of assigning
railways to foreign powers comes up for settlement. The refusal
has been demanded, and the diplomacy that has exacted it is
extolled, for no other reason than that it throws back the Euro-
peanisation of Persia for a further period, and consequently arrests
the fast-spreading commercial and political influence of Great
Britain in that country.
Personally, I do not think that the Russian diplomats are
wise in their generation. Apart from the fact that their attitude
Ineptitude in this matter can only confirm the suspicions already
poHc USSian entertairiecl th0 Shah ancl his ministers, that Russia's
interest in Persia is exclusively a selfish one, and that
she prefers stagnation to progress because she prefers a debilitated
to a robust patient, I believe that, judged from their own stand
point, the policy of the Russians will, in this case, recoil upon them
selves. 1 am by no means certain that an interval of ten years
during which the commercial and industrial enterprises recently
started can be steadfastly and tranquilly pursued; during which
toads, the natural precursors and feeders of railways, are con
structed throughout the country; during which more' extensive
information is gained as to the mineral and other resources of
Persia ; and during which European systems of business, manage
ment, and administration become familiar to the people, will not be
of the greatest advantage both to Persia and to the European well-
wishers for her future. Above all, I incline to the opinion that the
power most likely to profit by such a respite is not Russia, but
Great Britain, inasmuch as it is by British and not by Russian
capital that the natural resources of the country will be developed
in the interim, and that it will be upon more reliable data than at
present exist, that England will ultimately take up the question of
radroad extension in Persia, of which every year that passes renders
the final settlement more likely upon British lines. In Persia,
however, it is never wise to look too far ahead or to predict too con
fidently of the future, and circumstances may occur to induce the
Russians to repent of their, present conspiracy and to hurry on the
very consummation which they are now so anxious to avert. We
may, therefore, not inappropriately take advantage of the prevail
ing inaction to examine the various directions and routes from or