'Persia and the Persian Question by the Hon. George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P.' [‎622] (691/714)

622 PERSIA
happens to be notorious for its general dearth of wood ; for the lack
so far as discovery has hitherto proceeded, of seams of coal
qualified to supply the needs of an extensive railway service, or of
naphtha in sufficient quantities to take its place in the engines •
and for the absence, in situations where they can be worked with
profit, of iron mines, capable of producing the material for rails.
All these desiderata may conceivably be forthcoming in the future •
and the prospect is far from discouraging. But to assert that they
are now, or will shortly be, accessible is to substitute conjecture for
fact, and to render poor service to the cause of Persian regeneration.
Greater, however, than any impediment, either physical or
commercial, to the introduction of railroads into Persia that has
Russian llitlierto been mentioned, is the political obstacle imposed
antago- by the stubborn and selfish antagonism of Russia T
riisni i ll i . . 0 ' x
snail have occasion m my concluding chapter to add
something about the general attitude of that Power towards
Persian reforms ; but what I shall here say about her policy in the
matter of Persian railways, will afford no mean illustration of my
later thesis. This I assert without fear of contradiction, that,
whenever and whatever the scheme propounded, the bitter opposi
tion of Russia may be counted upon as a certain factor in the case
of any railways in Persia but those specially aligned to suit
Russian commercial or strategical needs, i.e. railways running
from the Russian frontier, either in Azerbaijan or in Khorasan, or
from the Caspian to Teheran. With the exception of these lines,
which would facilitate Russian ascendency and that alone, the
Russian influence at Teheran is steadily cast in the scale against
any other Persian railway that may be proposed. This is no
hypothetical assumption, but can be demonstrated beyond the
possibility of doubt by events which have occurred during the last
three years.
When tht British Minister at leheran, in the autumn of 1888,
obtained from the Shah what is commonly called the Karun
Railway Concession, i.e. the opening to navigation, not by Great
prohibition Britain alone, but by all countries, of the Lower Karun
River from Mohammerah to Ahwaz, many British newspapers
committed the error both of exaggerating the importance of the
concession, which in its undeveloped state has up till now been
almost valueless, and of extolling the successful diplomacy that
extorted it. The concession itself was one which had long