'Persia and the Persian Question by the Hon. George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P.' [‎442] (501/714)

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PERSIA
the realisation of the desired profit; and the system by which the
mudakhil is extracted does not come to an end untif the bottom
of the descending scale has been reached, and there is no further
victim from whoni to grind out a gain. An Austrian, Baron von
Teufenstein, was finance officer of the district of Saveh for a year,
from 1881 to 1882, and published a most interesting account of his
experiences, in which he said that his predecessor paid 25,000
francs lor his office (the mudakhil of the sovereign, or of the
minister who procured him the post), and cleared 80,000 francs by
his year's tenure of it (his own mudakhil). If, however, in the
sphere of administration this graduated scale of extortion be deemed
either not extraordinary or normal, it will perhaps excite greater
astonishment when observed in active existence in the army. It
may safely be averred that no general officer obtains his post with-
out a substantial money equivalent. His own profit consists in
what he can extract from the colonels and majors under his
command. They, m their turn, squeeze the captains and
lieutenants; and these, not behindhand in resourcefulness, extract
moisture from what one would, prima facie, imagine to be the flinty
consistency of the Persian infantry soldier, by selling to him the
privilege of furlough, or leave to work as an artisan in the bazaar.
Ihe last illustration which I shall give will be taken from
domestic life. Here mudahhil is the commission exacted by your
servant (in a Persian household usually by a member of the family,
specially commissioned) upon every article that you purchase, or
e\ti_\ oider that you give. This is conceded to him as a matter
of light by the vendor, who accordingly names a price, ten per
cent, oi more, in excess of that which he requires for his own
profit, the balance to go to the domestic; and by the master, who
kmm s a \ ell enough that he is paying ten per cent, above the
market value. Still, miidakhil must exist all round ; and seeing
that he himself is doubtless making it on a larger scale elsewhere,
why should he be so unjust as to complain ?
If v\ e examine this system in the light in which it affects the
pockc ts and the interests of the governed, it is obvious that it
Effect on
must result in wholesale and illicit extortion. Take the
santry 1 Case tenant or farmer of any office who has had to
pay a substantial price for his nomination. He requires,
m the first place, to recoup himself for this outlay. Next he has to
collect the stipulated annual revenue for the Royal or Ministerial
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