'Persia and the Persian Question by the Hon. George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P.' [‎436] (495/714)

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PERSIA
Luristan. Of these, the last-named alone retains either the title
or any shadow of independence. Governor-generals and lieu
tenant-governors are usually called hakim, the latter sometimes
naib-el-hukumah. Under the governors are the darojhah, or head
of police; the Imlantar, or mayor of a city, and the ledkhoda,
who is either the chief of a ward or parish if in a town, or the head
man of a village. The principal governorships are conferred upon the
king's sons, brothers, uncles, or relations, but to nothing like the in
tolerable and almost criminal extent that prevailed at the beginning
of the century. The governor is now also, as a rule, resident in
his province, instead of being an absentee at the capital. He is
commonly assisted in the work of administration, and more espe
cially in the fiscal side of government, by a vizier or minister.
Among the nomad and military tribes a different system of ap
pointments and titles prevails, the governors of the Kurdish,
Bakhtiari, and other clans being known as Jlkhani and llbegi, and
their subordinate chiefs as khan, sheikh, tushmal, &c., all of these
being responsible for the collection of revenue to the governor of
the province in which they reside.
Ostensibly, in the creation of this governing hierarchy, the
sovereign is absolute and supreme. Here again, however, in
Modifica- P ra ctice, very considerable checks are found to exist
tions of upon his prerogative. As I showed in my chapter upon
1 Khorasan, in the case of the Ilkhanis of Kuchan and
Bujnurd, and of the Amir of Kain, and, as I shall subsequently
show in a chapter dealing with the Feili and Bakhtiari Lurs, the
Shah is practically compelled to choose a governor from the ruling
family ; nor is it easy for him to interfere with the custom of direct
hereditary succession. Similarly, in the cases of local magistrates
or head men, such as the hdantars in cities, and the kedkhodas in
wards or villages, although nominally he has a free choice, yet in
reality he must make a selection that is agreeable to the in
habitants. Otherwise the authority of government falls into
abeyance; and, what is regarded as much more serious in Persia,
the revenue fails to come in*. Hence, the popular choice as a rule
marking out some individual for the exercise of these offices, and
the Shah for expediency's sake accepting it as his guide, some
writers have seen in this fact an introduction of the elective or
representative principle into Persian administration. In many
cases it happens that the office is practicalIv hereditary in a single