'Persia and the Persian Question by the Hon. George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P.' [‎386] (439/714)

386
PERSIA
plausible excuse which Persia can offer, apart from her congenital
inability to help herself, is the fear that she may have felt of
providing, by any of the means above indicated, an easier path of
invasion to a hostile power, or, in other words, to Russia. Such a
fear is, perhaps, venial, but I do not think that it constitutes either
an honourable or a valid excuse. The power that designedly
fosters its own weakness, ultimately perishes of the atrophv thus
engendered. Moreover, Russia can march so easilv into Persia
from other quarters that her power of aggression would be but
little augmented by the removal of obstacles from one out of many
channels of invasion.
And thus I am brought to the question, with which I will
conclude this chapter, of the alleged designs of Russia upon the
northern provinces, and of the probable place allotted to
designs them in her political horoscope. There can be no doubt
( " lan that ever since the temporary occupation of Gilan in the
Mazan- reign of Peter the Great, Russia has turned a regretful
and covetous eye upon the Persian possessions to the south
of the Caspian Sea. It is also a matter of common knowledge
that, on occasions when the Shah has shown too marked a disposition
either to independent or to Anglophile action, he has been signifi
cantly reminded of that bygone incident, and has been threatened
with its repetition. It is further true that Russia could land her
forces either at Resht or at Gez without, in all probability,
incurring any armed opposition. Lastly, it is rumoured that in
the famous secret memorandum drawn up by General Kuropatkin,
now Governor-General of Transcaspia, in 1885, and generally ac
cepted as the official scheme for a Russian invasion of India, the
incorporation of Gilan and Mazanderan, as well as of Azerbaijan
and Khorasan, are treated as indispensable preliminaries upon the
Persian stage of operations. There is therefore abundant ground
for believing that Russia regards these particular provinces with
a not wholly disinterested vision. Sir Justin Sheil, himself a
British Minister in Persia, and consequently well-informed, echoed
and confirmed the general impression when he wrote:—
That Gilan should have been long coveted by Russia is not sur
prising. Everything contributes to make it a desirable possession;
its situation relative to Russia, its wealth and improvable qualities,
its defensible position—mountains on one side, the sea on the other,
swamps and jungles all over the province. 1
1 Note H to Lady Shell's Glimpses of Life in Persia.