'Persia and the Persian Question by the Hon. George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P.' [‎236] (271/714)

280
PERSIA
easterly direction. The former aspect of the case indicates its
value to Russia; the latter to Great Britain.
Seistan presents to Russia a positive and a negative value, of
which it is difficult to say which is the more important. Should
Value to s ^ e any time find it politic or necessary to absorb
Uussia Khorasan, the possession of Seistan would give her the
whole and not the northern portion only of that province. It
would further establish her in a position of close and almost im
mediate proximity to the advanced Indian frontier in Beluchistan.
At present there intervene between her own and the Indian border
500 miles of Afghan territory, which, though presenting not the
slightest physical obstacle to advance, are tenanted by wild tribes
much attached to their own independence, even if uninspired by
any loyalty to their sovereign. In other words, advance through
Afghanistan means hard fighting with Afghans by whomever it is
undertaken. Solemn engagements would have to be broken, great
forces collected, and daily risk incurred, while such an adventure
was in course of execution. On the other hand, should a Russian
force, desirous—I will not say of invading Hindustan, because we
are not at present called upon to discuss any such remote pos
sibility, but of acquiring a position menacing and contiguous to
Hindustan, take up its quarters in Seistan, the above-mentioned
perils are thereby one and all avoided, no Anglo-Russian compact is
violated, no savage Afghans require to be fought. The forward frontier
of Russia would be brought over 300 miles nearer to the advanced
O
frontier of India ; and the change in position would involve a pro
portionately greater anxiety, outlay, and peril to the latter.
Russia would be unlikely to march even from Seistan against
Quetta ; but she would have unlimited opportunities from this
base of intriguing with trans-frontier tribes, and of nibbling at
Beluchistan. How far her position against Afghanistan would be
strengthened is also self-evident. Russia in Khorasan means
Russia at Herat; and Russia in Seistan would mean Russia at
Sebzewar and Farrah as well, the two most important strategical
points on the march from Herat to Kandahar.
I do not for the moment lay stress upon the other aspect of
the positive value to Russia of Seistan—viz. as facilitating her ap
proach to the southern seas—because I assume that a Russian port
upon the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. or the Indian Ocean would no more be
tolerated by any English minister or government than would an