Coll 6/67(4) 'Boundaries of South Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎336v] (672/843)

to the grant of the oil concession (which Fuad Bey had mentioned). We had
promised the Sheikh protection, and we must be in a position to carry out that
promise in any and every contingency, however little we might fear having to do ^
so. I suggested that this was a very real reason for objecting to direct ^
correspondence between the Sheikh and Ibn Sand on important matters. If we
promised protection we must have the means of protection, and we must be the
judges of what was necessary to provide us with the means. I adverted to the
letter which Ibn Saud had addressed to the Sheikh of Qatar some months ago
regarding the oil concession and to the subsequent correspondence to which it
had given rise. That letter, I said, was in the nature of an ultimatum, backed
by a threat, and we had protested as politely as possible. 1 he Saudi Government
had taken exception to our protest, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had relied on the
wording of article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda as defeating it. That article did
not, however, stand alone. It had been led up to and it had been followed by the
communication to Ibn Saud of our treaties with the rulers mentioned in it, a
communication made by agreement, in order that he might have knowledge of
the nature of the special relations of which he had taken cognisance in article 6 .
16. Fuad Bey said that the communication to which I referred did not
include our treaty with Qatar. I questioned this, and said that it had certainly
been intended to include it. It was a published document, and if he had not got
it, I could let him have it at any time. Fuad Bey admitted that the question
whether it had, in fact, been communicated was of no essential importance, but
asked what the position would be if the direct agreement between the Sheikh of
Qatar and Ibn Saud, which he had invoked, were antecedent to the Anglo-Qatar
Treaty. I said I thought it would make no difference, as, although that treaty
had not been concluded until 1916. Qatar had long formed part of the system of
States in special relations with His Majesty’s Government. I reminded him,
■ speaking from memory, that, in the note communicating the agreements with the
rulers named in article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda, we had expressly said that our
position did not rest only on treaty texts, but on a whole series of past
f transactions. I also reminded him, again speaking from memory only, that
Qatar was so much a concern of ours before the Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916 that
it had, I thought, been the subject of a special chapter in one of the pre-war
Anglo-Turkish conventions. The Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916 had merely
reduced to written form pre-existing arrangements. Fuad Bey suggested that
before the treaty of 1916 was concluded the Sheikh of Qatar was free to negotiate
direct with Ibn Saud. Later in the discussion I asked whether the direct agree
ment about the Jebel Dukhan and the Araiq was, in fact, antecedent to the
Anglo-Qatar Treaty. Fuad Bey said it was.
17. I refused to entertain Fuad Bey’s claim to the Khor-al-Odeid. I
maintained that, even if it were a means of maritime access to the neighbouring
part of Saudi Arabia, no territorial claim could be founded on this any more
than Ibn Saud could claim Koweit because it was, or ought to be, a port feeding
the Saudi area inland. If the Saudi Government wanted an arrangement about
trade through the Khor that was another matter. Fuad Bey enlarged the issue
at this stage by saying that, if we reached an agreement about the frontier, it
would be necessary to have some sort of frontier arrangements for administrative
and suchlike purposes. He quoted the parallel of the arrangements in the
treaties with Iraq and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan .
18. I outlined the procedure which His Majesty’s Government had in view.
My present object, I said, was to seek an agreement in principle regarding the
frontier line. If this were arrived at, it would be necessary to embody it in a
treaty, to which His Majesty’s Government would be parties, for themselves and
the Sheikhs of Qatar and Abu Dhabi, and to which the Sultan of Muscat and
Oman would also be a party. His Majesty’s Government had in view one matter,
which came within the scope of what Fuad Bey had just said, but which I had
not yet mentioned. I read paragraph 18 of Foreign Office despatch No. 309 of
the 23rd October regarding the freedom of tribes to use their normal wells and
grazing grounds on whichever side of the frontier they might be situated. Fuad
Bey contemplated more general frontier arrangements. I doubted whether the
conditions on the frontier now in question were similar to those on the Iraq and
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontiers, but, subject to the fact that I had no instructions other
than' those I had read. I agreed that arrangements appropriate to the local
conditions might well be embodied in an eventual treaty.