Coll 6/67(4) 'Boundaries of South Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎112r] (223/843)

which would in any case make its eventual fulfilment uncertain. Sir R. Bullard
added that His Majesty’s Government were obliged, as members of the League
of Nations, to register all treaties with the League. Mr. Rendel then went on to
say, as he had said the previous day, that he could hardly imagine any occasion
on which a threat to Saudi Arabia would not be a threat to His Majesty’s
Government, and added that this community of interests was a stronger bond
than many a treaty. We had given too many promises in the past, under pressure
of war in particular, and could not give one in this case. Sir Reader Bullard
reminded the King once more of the terms of the Rome Agreement of 1927.^ His
Majesty’s Government had recorded in writing that they regarded it as a “ vital
imperial interest that no European Power should establish itself on the Arabian
shore of the Red Sea.” The King seemed to derive comfort from this
conversation.
Fourth Interview, March 22.
21. The King said that in this the last conversation before Mr. Rendel s
departure he wished to speak about Palestine. The Arabs were now really
alarmed by the Zionist policy. They feared that a Jewish Government would
be established in Palestine and would include Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan in its scope, and they
were even beginning to fear that there might be designs on Medina itself, the
burial-place of the Prophet Mahomet. Some of these fears might be exaggerated,
and due to irresponsible talk by individual Jews, but there was also genuine
ground for apprehension, and he himself was very anxious about the question.
Great Britain was powerful and could crush the Arab opposition, but he feared
that there might be dangerous repercussions in other Moslem countries in which
His Majesty’s Government had special interests, e.g., Egypt, Iraq and India.
There were many enemies watching for an opportunity to injure Great Britain.
The chief of these was, of course, Italy. The attempt that Italy was making
to win recognition as the friend of Moslems in general and of the Arabs in
particular was well known. The Italians had used the pilgrimage for piopa-
ganda purposes, and had done their best to induce him to speak in praise of their
pro-Moslem policy. He had resisted this attempt, and he had no belief
whatever in Italian professions, for he knew what had happened in Tripoli and
in Abyssinia, but there was a real danger from the Italians, nevertheless, if the
troubles in Palestine should flare up again. Nor were the Turks inactive. They
had many agents in Palestine, who never failed to rub it into the Arabs that the
result of their revolt against the Turks was subordination to the Jews. The
Zionist policy, as it was being carried out at present, was contrary to British
interests, and that was one reason why he was against it. As a Moslem and an
Arab he naturally sympathised with the Arabs of Palestine. He had suppressed
these personal feelings hitherto out of friendship for His Majesty’s Government,
and he could always suppress his feelings if policy required it. But the Zionist
policy was not even in the interests of Great Britain. Moreover, His Majesty’s
Government must realise that he stood alone, and that he had to think of his
position in a Moslem world where he was the butt of much criticism, and where
many of his co-religionists would not even admit that he was a Moslem. He felt
that he had come to the end of what he could do in the matter of Palestine.
22. His Majesty was assured that his views would be communicated to His
Majesty’s Government without delay. . . .
23 Ibn Baud said that he had one last question. Suppose that there was
trouble in the Yemen and the Italians asked him about it. as they might very well
do; what should he say ? Should he reply to this effect
He did not propose to interfere in the internal affairs of the Yemen, and
the Rome understanding of 1927, the relevant part of which had been
communicated to him by the Italians as well as by the British, seemed to
require them both to adopt a similar attitude of non-intervention.
Mr. Rendel said that this reply seemed to meet the circumstances exactly.