'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME IV.' [‎204v] (413/540)

348
HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
APPENDIX XLII.
Copy of Letter from Mustapha Kemal to Enver Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , dated
SOth September, 1917.
I beg to forward the following observations on the general situation. They
are submitted to Your Excellency, who is responsible for the direction of
the country’s destiny, after deep consideration and not in any spirit of panic
or pessimism.
1. The general state of the country should be considered before everything
else. The war has been brought home to our people more than to any other
country. The link between the people and its Government has been broken.
Those that remain in their homes are fortunate in escaping the attention
of the central authority, for though the people—women, cripples or deserters
have not enough to live on, the civil and military administrations are compelled
to be more and more severe in their levies of supplies. The Government
finds it impossible to control the general situation, which is sinking into
anarchy. The measures it takes in the name of the people are opposed to the
latter’s rights, and the population is becoming more and more discontented.
The weakness of the civil administration has been further increased by
want, corruption, profiteering, inferior officials, and the breakdown of justice.
The evils are apparent in every part of the country. There are strong
indications of disaster in ordinary trade and the provision of supplies. Con
sequently, if the war continues, the greatest danger by which we are confronted
is the probable internal dissolution of the Empire, threatened as it is in
every direction.
2. The military situation gives no sign of an early cessation of the war.
Our allies are intent on a peace obtained by the aid of military forces, and
will have no discussion as to terms. The Germans' possibilities are limited,
and they can only say to their enemies : “ Come, try and conquer us.” The
Entente Powers have shown that they will not make peace separately, and
it is obvious that they will continue the war, as long as we can hold out,
in the hope of saving their own countries and obtaining favourable terms..
The war, therefore, is likely to continue for a considerable time. Our side
does not hold the key to peace, but somehow we have to win.
3. The military situation of Turkey is as follows. Our forces are very weak.
ompared with what they were at the beginning of the war, the strength of
many armies has decreased by eighty per cent. The resources of the country
si y nan P°. wer ca nnot bring them up to strength. Fifty per cent, of the
Mth Division which was sent to me was composed of immature youths of
17 to 20 or unfit men of 45 to 55.
The battalions of another of the best divisions left Stamboul 1,000 strong
and arrived at Aleppo with 500 each. The reason of this is the unsatisfactory
ot of the people and the state of the civil administration. My illustration
shows that even if all our resources were collected we should not be sufficiently
strong. It is unnecessary to mention the deficiencies in the corps of officers
in quality and quantity.
The situation at all the points is as follows:—
In the West we are not in contact with the enemy. But, as Stamboul
is on one of the maritime highways of the world and is our richest province,
i is quite probable that the enemy will strike at it from the west. In the
Caucasus the situation is one of stalemate, and it is impossible for us to
make headway. The internal situation of Russia and the Russian dependence
on Europe makes an offensive impossible. But if for some reason they did
advance, we are not in a position to hinder or threaten them. The Russians