'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME IV.' [‎52v] (109/540)

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HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA
The position of deployment for the Cavalry Division was as
given by General Maude, but that for the 7th Division was
about two miles west of the line given by General Maude,
and from that point its advanced guard was to advance two miles
northward at 4.30 a.m. and then, at 5.30 a.m., followed by
the whole division, north-eastward against the western side
of the Turkish salient. The 21st Brigade Group, moving up
the Tigris left bank to co-operate with the attack on the right
bank by shell fire and to protect our watering parties on that
bank, was to reach a point five miles due south of Daur not
earlier than 6 a.m., in readiness to push on to Daur. Further,
the 9th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division was to be in readiness
at Samarra to move forward as a reserve if required.
About 4 p.m. on the 1st November, an enemy aeroplane
flew over the British concentration area, but it is not known
if its occupants observed anything unusual.* The moon rose
at 6.49 p.m. on the 1st November and facilitated the long night
march. The Cavalry Division had about twenty-four miles to
cover to reach its point of deployment, and at about 4.15 a.m.
on the 2 nd the leading brigade ( 6 th) saw camp fires to the
north and north-east which appeared to mark the right flank
of the enemy position. Considering that his division was too
far to the east General Jones ordered a change of direction to
the north-west, and the division, believing it had reached the
vicinity of its allotted position, halted about 4.30 a.m.
Actually, however, it had halted to the south-west of it. General
Fane’s troops, one brigade of which had a march of nineteen
miles to make, began moving at 5.30 p.m., and reached their
position of deployment by 4.30 a.m. without a hitch.
In a personal reconnaissance to the east, carried out shortly
before dawn, the commander of the 6 th Cavalry Brigade
could not find the enemy’s camps which he had been directed
to shell; and at 6.15 a.m. he moved off in a north-easterly
direction with his brigade and “ V ” Battery, R.H.A., to try
and turn the enemy’s right flank so as to assist our infantry
attack. But, being soon checked by fire from the enemy’s
second line, the brigade moved further westward so as to
threaten the enemy’s rear, only to be held off again by con
siderable hostile artillery fire. At 6.15 a.m. also, the 13th
Lancers of the 7th Cavalry Brigade had been ordered to
advance towards Auja to guard against any hostile movement
from there against the left flank of the Cavalry Division.
Mistaking its direction, however, the regiment found itself
in front of the enemy second line and was forced to take cover
* Strict orders had been issued for the troops to remain under cover during
the hours of daylight; but as the area could be seen by enemy patrols from
the neighbourhood of Eski Baghdad it is possible that they may have had
reason to suspect a large concentration at this time.