'File 4/9 I Anglo-Kuwait Relations' [‎61r] (130/436)

apprehensions and might even cause the local sheikhs to turn away
from His Majesty’s Government and consider submitting themselves
to Persia or to Ibn Saud.
(c) The basis of His Majesty’s Government’s present treaty relationship
with Koweit was unsatisfactory. In the first place, it did not rest,
as was the case with Bahrein, Muscat and the Trucial Sheikhdoms,
on a long series of formal treaties with the Sheikh dating back for
over a century, or, as in the case of Qatar, on a comprehensive treaty,
but was based only on a comparatively brief correspondence exchanged
between the sheikhs and His Majesty’s Government since 1899 and on
the reciprocal engagements, still presumably binding since they had
not been abrogated, entered into in connexion with the lease of Bunder
Shweikh in 1907; secondly, there were certain gaps, e.g., we had no
slavery agreement with Koweit. It might, he suggested, be possible
to fill in the gaps left by this correspondence and tighten our control
in that way. An example was our recent request to the Sheikh for
certain undertakings in regard to air facilities in his sheikhdom, one
result of which would be to concentrate effective control of such
facilities, whether military or civil, in the hands of His Majesty’s
Government. Another instance was the recent proposed amendment
of the Koweit Order in Council A regulation issued by the sovereign of the United Kingdom on the advice of the Privy Council. so as to place responsibility for
jurisdiction over non-Moslem foreigners in the hands of His Majesty’s
Government. A gradual tightening of our control of this character,
particularly if pursued as a definite policy on all convenient
occasions, would, he thought, at once avoid the difficulties involved
in establishing a formal protectorate and would make it very much
simpler.
Colonel Fowle expressed the view that there did not seem to be any inter
mediate position possible between a treaty relationship with the Sheikh on the
present lines and a full protectorate. The Sheikh would certainly be unwilling
to agree to the sheikhdom becoming a formal protectorate, and, prima facie, he
(Colonel Fowle) was not much in favour of it. He agreed, however, that it
would be advisable, on suitable opportunities, to try to tighten up our control over
the Sheikh.
On being questioned whether he did not consider that our restricted position
vis-a-vis of the Sheikh in regard to the Koweit oil concession indicated the
essential weakness of our treaty position, he replied that our difficulties in that
case had been due rather to the special undertakings given to the United States
Government in that matter than to any weakness in our normal control over the
Sheikh under the treaty engagements. Had we been able, without violating our
pledges to the United States Government, to tell the Sheikh that we required him
to give the concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company he would have done so.
Mr. Rendel drew attention to the fact that in the event of serious misgovern-
ment by the Ruler of Koweit such as prejudicially to affect foreign citizens in
Koweit, we might find ourselves in a difficult position vis-d-vis of the foreign
Power concerned.
Mr. Laithwaite said that on this point he thought that Bahrein might be
regarded as locus classicus. We had for many years put up with a considerable
degree of misgovernment by Sheikh Isa. But when conditions at last, in our
view, became intolerable, we did not hesitate to intervene and to depose the
Sheikh. There were obvious arguments for doing so, for were we not to intervene
when misgovernment had reached a certain pitch, it would be most difficult for
us to justify a refusal to allow foreign Governments which might be affected to
take steps to protect the interests of their nationals. He did not think that there
need be any apprehension in the case of Koweit that we would fail to bring
pressure on a sheikh who was abusing his position, once it became necessary to
do so. The case for early intervention would probably be stronger now that
the Gulf was so much more in the public eye.
The meeting then went on to consider relations between Ibn Saud and
Koweit.
[935 1—1] b 2