Coll 17/10(1) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎118v] (241/982)

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been distressed, since his return from Europe, to find the Prime Minister in a
highly nervous condition, and really not to be trusted to give a reasoned opinion
on any important matter.
17. If it be for me to judge between the two men, I feel bound to say that
it seems to me to be Yasin who has kept his wisdom.
18. I then told Nuri that I had heard from people in authority, such as
his own brother-in-law, Ja’far-al-Askeri, that in order to make his honour safe
again King Ghazi must kill his sister. Nuri agreed that this was so. If i t
were known in Iraq that the girl had been killed by King Ghazi or on His
Majesty’s direct orders, his honour would be restored in all Arab countries. I
lost no time in repeating to Nuri the solemn warning that I had given to Yasin
He hedged a little, and said that it would not much matter who killed the princess
so long as she died. Perhaps it would not shock the world so much if it could
be made to appear outside Iraq that the murder had not been committed at Kim
Ghazi’s direct instance. He was himself opposed to savagery of this kind, but
the death of the princess was undoubtedly the ideal solution of the present
problem. As regards the rest of the world, he appreciated that the effect would
be unfortunate, but it must be remembered that King Ghazi had to reign in Irac
and not in Europe. As our conversation went on, he agreed that if the princess
were allowed to live and her marriage were dissolved, and if then, perhaps, sbe
were shut up for a time somewhere in Europe, it was not improbable that public
indignation would be to some extent quietened. In conclusion, Nuri said that
he was telling me frankly of everything that had been passing in his mind,
because it was obvious that His Majesty’s Government, having special interest
in Iraq’s welfare, could not remain unconcerned in the face of such a situation.
He was sure that the Iraqi Government would welcome, and be grateful for, any
guidance which His Majesty’s Government might feel able to offer.
19. The Prime Minister and Nuri dined with me the day after. Yasin
arrived first, and thanked me warmly for having spoken to Nuri, for what I had
said had obviously shaken Nuri’s belief in his own plan. After I had left the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs yesterday, Nuri had gone at once to Yasin, and had
said that, in the course of his conversation with me, the idea of a regency had
suddenly occurred to him, and he had thought that I would be the best person
upon whom to test it. Nuri had, I gathered, somewhat dramatised what had
passed between himself and me, for it seems that my reactions to his proposal
had been remarkable. I had gone pale and averted my face, and had beaten
my forehead with the palms of my hands. On recovering from what obviously
must have been a great shock to me, I had used strong arguments against a
regency, and all this had led him to the belief that it would probably be wiser to
drop his plan.
20. When the time came to discuss the matter Nuri approached it with
something of his old calm. I asked him if he had told the Prime Minister of
his plan, and, on hearing that he had, I reiterated the arguments I had used to
him the day before, and I said that, to my mind, the best course open to the
Government was to purge the Royal household of the equivocal people with whom
King Ghazi had chosen to surround himself, to establish strict control over His
Majesty’s actions and movements, to keep him for a time in the background, and
to hope that, with care and hard work, his reputation and authority would be
restored in time and the unhappy story of his sister forgotten.
21. The Prime Minister said that he thought that I was possibly under
estimating the extent to which King Ghazi had lost face during the last few
days. It would be a very difficult task to restore his authority and redeem his
reputation. Nevertheless, he agreed with me that this task should be attempted
before other courses, such as the creation of a regency, were considered. He held
strongly that it was impossible for Iraq to be governed without an effective
Sovereign. Some man, standing above the parties and personalities, who could
hold the balance in politics and be a court of appeal for those who felt wronged
or oppressed was essential to Iraq, and, for this reason, his main purpose was
to re-establish King Ghazi’s authority.
22. After rearguing, without much conviction, his proposal for a regency,
Nuri was brought to acquiescence in the rough outline of policy which I had
suggested.
23. The Prime Minister then pointed out that it was possible that the
Government might find themselves in conflict with His Majesty over the ordering
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