Coll 17/10(1) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎113r] (230/982)

EASTERN (Iraq).
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 3062/1575/93]
May 28, 1936.
j', z,
Section 1.
Copy No.
119
Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.— {Received May 28.)
( Na 254 ' ) - Bagdad, May 22, 1936.
U I HAVE the honour to report that, since the date of my despat ch No. 245 of
the 14th May, there has been little military activity of importance m the disturnm
area about Rumaitha. The forces concentrated there have been divided into
three columns, based respectively on Rumaitha, Abu Tabikh (10 miles north o
Rumaitha), and Aridhat (between Abu Tabikh and Rumaitha), and are at presen
engaged in minor punitive operations against the rebel tribesmen. Practically
iio°opposition has been encountered for some days. Numerous villages have been
destroyed and large areas of crops burned. Some stories of brutality on the part
of the troops are now beginning to reach Bagdad. Few prisoners have, it seems,
been taken, and there are the usual rumours of the shooting out of hand of parties
of surrendering tribesmen with their womenfolk. I am not at present m a
position to assess the truth of such reports, but they do not seem to be out o
harmony with Bakr Sidqi’s reputation for ruthlessness. ^ i i ,i
2. The Minister of the Interior (Rashid Ali) returned to Bagdad on the
14th May and appeared to be well satished with his work at Diwaniyah What
exactly he did there is not known to me, but it is said that he worked hard to keep
other neighbouring tribes from joining the revolt and that he spent money l a vis y
to this end. His efforts seem, I am bound to say, to have been successful, for,
although small detachments of sympathisers from other tribes have taken part m
the fighting, the revolt in the main was confined to the septs of the Bam Huchaim
Confederation. , ^ ^ £
3 The Prime Minister, whom I saw on the 17th May on my return from a
visit to MosuP, told me that all the important chieftains of the insurgent tribe?
had submitted, and that the revolt might be considered to be at an end. home
thirty of the sheikhs would, he said, be tried by court-martial m a few days, but
the rank and file had been punished enough by their losses in action, ibis time,
he added, there would be no general amnesty such as he had granted last year a
few weeks after the military court had finished its work. If that sort of thing
were done habitually, martial law would lose its salutary effect. He had
instructed the court carefully to sift all the evidence, with a view to establish the
real cause of the trouble. In his opinion, malicious agitators were mainly
responsible, and he hoped that the court would expose and punish them. He was
referring to the local Shiah clergy, and he said that if guilt weie eventually
traced to them they would be shown no mercy. t *
4. He also told me that the Government were working out a plan for
scattering the rebel tribesmen among less turbulent elements, and giving then
lands to others whose loyalty could be better counted upon. It was intended, also,
completely to disarm those tribal septs who were mainly responsible foi the
disorders
5. I mentioned that I had heard that a deputation of a number of men
prominent in public life had recently visited the Ring in order to protest against
the severity of the Government s treatment of the rebels, and I asked whet ei
this was true. His Excellency told me that Naji Suwaidi, Hikmat Sulaiman,
Jafar Chalabi Abu Timman, Jamil Madfai, Maulud Mukhlis, Abdul Aziz Qassab,
and one or two others had composed this deputation, and had complained bitter y
to His Majesty about the constant bloodshed to which, they alleged, the policy of
the Government was leading. According to the Prime Minister, King G azi gaxe
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