'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎131r] (266/454)

AMARA ADVANCE SANCTIONED
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boats to secure the line of communication ; he also considered
that by this advance we were giving up an impregnable position
for one of dissemination of forces. It is of interest to note,
in regard to this opinion, that General Barrow, Lord Crewe’s
principal military adviser, informed the Mesopotamia Commis
sion that he had since come to the conclusion, in the light of
subsequent events, that the Government of India were justified
in recommending this movement. His reason for this conclusion
was that the Turkish operations towards Ahwaz showed the
necessity of holding Amara in order to ensure the security of
the oil-fields and pipe-line.
Lord Crewe on the same day sent a “ clear the line ” telegram
sanctioning the proposed movement on the clear understanding
that General Nixon was satisfied that he could concentrate a
sufficient garrison at Amara to withstand any attack during the
summer from Baghdad, as it might be difficult during that
period to move up reinforcements, and General Nixon must
understand clearly that no more troops could be sent to
Mesopotamia. Lord Crewe went on to say that he should have
been consulted regarding this movement before the last
moment, for, as he said, “ Questions jointly involving civil and
military policy should under present circumstances only be
decided by the Cabinet.”
The Viceroy’s telegram of the 23rd and Lord Crewe’s reply
were repeated from India on the 24th to General Nixon for his
information and guidance. On the same day Lord Crewe
telegraphed to the Viceroy asking him to impress on General
Nixon the necessity of protecting the pipe-line throughout,
as the Admiralty attached great importance to the uninter
rupted maintenance of oil supply at Abadan and regarded it
as a matter of extreme urgency.
On the 25th May, General Nixon wired to India at some
length. He requested definite orders as to whether the occu
pation of Amara and Nasiriya was to be carried out in order to
obtain control of the Basra vilayet or not. It seemed to him
that the policy laid down in the written orders given to him on
the 24th March at Army Headquarters in India and that laid
down in the Secretary of State’s telegram of the 23rd May were
at variance. He did not think it probable that the 1 urks would
be able to collect very superior forces at Baghdad, but no
guarantee could be given that they would not. He took ex
ception to Lord Crewe’s apparent umbrage at having been
informed of the intended advance on Amara only at the
eleventh hour, pointing out that the possibility of an