'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎70v] (145/454)

120 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
it is generally inadvisable to make a definite plan of attack
before reconnaissance or contact with the enemy has discovpr^H
his dispositions.
About 6.30 a.m., the enemy’s former position at Saihan was
found to be unoccupied and was passed through by the right of
the advanced guard ; and it was not till 7.30 that the cavalry
reported hostile patrols near an old mud fort (see Map 1) and
about fifteen hundred yards west of it. About 8 a.m. they
reported about 1,200 enemy with five guns, distributed in
three parties and extending from a position to the east-north
east past the old mud fort to near Sahil. General Fry, com
manding the advanced guard, after hearing the report of a
cavalry officer sent back to him, decided to continue his advance
across the enemy’s front at a comparatively safe range, so as
to leave room for the main body to deploy on his right. At
the same time he ordered up the Norfolks on the right of the
7th Rajputs, who were leading. Turkish artillery near the old
fort now opened fire with a few shrapnel and the 23rd Mountain
Battery came into action (about 9.15), but found the range too
long. About 9.30 a very heavy rainstorm came on which
turned the surface of the ground into a quagmire and made
the going very heavy. The ships had meanwhile found that,
owing to the date plantations and to the shallows and islands
preventing a close approach to the shore, the operations could
only be observed from aloft. Fire was therefore controlled by
an officer with a megaphone at the masthead and at 9.15 this
officer saw two of the enemy’s guns leave the open and take
shelter, apparently as the result of the naval fire.
General Fry had now decided to direct his advance on a
mosque, about two and three-quarter miles north-west of the
old fort, which would bring him against the enemy’s right flank.
At 9.45 he was told by Force Headquarters that they were
reinforcing him with a battalion, and that the 16th Brigade
would operate on his right. At the same time, General Barrett
informed General Delamain, commanding 16th Brigade, that
the 18th Brigade would attack the hostile right and centre,
while the 16th Brigade, linking up with the right of the 18th
Brigade, were to attack the old fort, which then appeared to
be the enemy’s left flank. To carry out this operation, General
Delamain gave the following orders to his commanding officers:
the Dorsets were to attack (in a north-north-easterly direction)
on a frontage of three hundred and fifty yards with their right
flank directed on a point about one hundred yards south of the
old fort; the 20th Punjabis were to prolong the dine to the