File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎336r] (680/834)

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Abdullah, and he is known by the writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. to have made up his
mind at that time to obtain his revenge as soon as an
opportunity occurred ; he was itching to move Khurmawards
in person.
But although the King and Abdallah had been warned
consistently by us to avoid aggressive acts or even an advance
on Khurma, it must be emphasized that this policy of ours
was dictated purely by military expediency and was decided
upon in spite of our strong sympathy with the King’s claim to
Khurma. It was realized that the Sheri bans could spare neither
commanders, troops, nor guns from the forces which were
besieging Medina, and further, that a big defeat at Khurma at
that time would probably result in a disastrous re-action on
the siege operations by heartening Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. and enabling
him to come to some arrangement with Ibn Saud for the further
defence of the city or for surrendering it to the Ikhwan.
Little wjs done, however, by India to call off Ibn Saud
or to order him to cease his anti-Sherifian propaganda amongst
Hejaz tribes. The Indian view at that time was that it would
be wrong for us to support the King in military action against
our treaty ally, Ibn Sand, and it was not until March 1919
that a message was sent by H.M. Government to Ibn Saud
“ advising him to modify his attitude and to persuade his
followers from further opposition to the administrative measures
of King Husein at Khurma.”
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The fall of Medina in January 1919 left Abdullah free to
set out on his long-cherished expedition to Khurma, which, he
had often prophesied, would be over with the complete destruc
tion of Ibn Sand’s forces within two days of his (Abdullah's)
arrival on the scene.
It was feared by British advisers on both sides (Iraq and
Egypt) that Abdullah’s ill-advised move must inevitably result
in a collision of the rival forces, and it is quite probable that had
Abdullah remained in Medina the present crisis would not have
arisen. Indeed, had we been aware of the Emir’s actual warlike
intentions we should no doubt have strongly protested against
the advance, instead of merely suggesting the impropriety of it.
Abdullah’s regular force consisted of 60 officers, 770 other
ranks, 8 guns and 16 machine guns. It reached Asheirah early
in April.
As soon as he heard of Abdullah’s move from Medina,
Ibn Saud began counter preparations. He certainly warned
H.B.M. Government of these and, reasserting his wish for arbitra
tion, stated that he was compelled by pressure of public opinion
to take measures against aggression by the Sherifian troops.
“ if the King and Abdullah will remain in their own places,”