File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎321v] (651/834)

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Arabian chiefs : i.e. to gain as much security as possible from the
friendship of some powerful protector and to give as little as
possible in return. Geography, and the recent course of events,
suggest that the Idrisi is destined to be the protector ; what
degree of submission he can exact in return remains to be seem
Again, it is said that the Idrisi’s prestige has not been
enhanced by the war and that his military incompetence has
excited general comment. His military incompetence was indeed
remarkable according to European standards, but that Arabs
should be defied by a handful of Turks in entrenchments is a
fact by no means unparalleled in Arabia, where more remarkable
examples of military incompetence may pass without exciting
any comment at all. The Idrisi’s prestige was low during the
summer of 1918, but has regained more than all it had lost with
the downfall of the Turk, whose consistent enemy he had been.
The ready offers of submission which flowed in as soon as the
Turk got ready to depart are evidence of this.
In order that a really good understanding may be arrived at
between King Husein and the Idrisi, which would do much to
stabilize things in Arabia, the first thing to be done is to remove
one element of irritation and uncertainty by delimiting their
claims.. The two main points at issue are Ebhah, where there
appears to be a fait accompli which it will be difficult to undo,
and Kunfidah, which is as sore a point as ever with the Idrisi.
Both rulers would probably take quietly disappointments at the
hand of the British which they would not accept from each other,
provided the decisions had the appearance of reasoned awards,
rather than of mere bargains based on expediency.
The Idrisi is a much less attractive as well as a much less
important figure than King Husein or his sons, but he has certain
characteristics which make him a good man to have political
dealings with. Apparently in his very young and ambitious
days, when the whole matter of a national Arab movement against
the Turks was merely a dream full of untested possibilities, he
did contemplate some sort of league of Arab Emirs in which he
was to play the leading part. Probably it is the memory of this
presumption which inclines King Husein to think of him chiefly
as an interloper. But the bent of the Idrisi’s mind is, above all,
practical, and concerned with the present and the future. Loyalty
and interest now both attach him to the British, whose position
in the world he is by no means inclined to underestimate, and
will supply a strong reason why their friends should be his
friends. Moreover, if he once makes an engagement, his record
shows that he is more likely than most Arabs to keep it.
As Seyyid Mustafa has often said, there is no “ Keraha, ”
between the Idrisi and the King. The Idrisi is not, however, in
the least likely to admit any assumption of superior standing on
the part of the King, far less to make any kind of real submission
to him at present. He is, so far as other Arabian rulers are
concerned, exceedingly touchy about his dignity, and probably
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